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A Study of Cross-Border Takeovers: Examining the Impact of National Culture on 
Internalization Benefits, and the Implications of Early Versus Late-Mover Status 
for Bidders and Their Rivals
Tanja Steigner
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two self-contained chapters that empirically examine 
bidder firm returns of U.S. companies in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
In chapter one I examine how cultural distance between bidder and target country 
impacts internalization benefits. The results suggest that shareholders are initially 
concerned about the acquisition in culturally distant countries, which outweighs any 
potential benefits from internalization. However, in the long-run we observe a significant 
reversal of these findings. In the second and third year following the announcement, 
greater cultural distance positively impacts the bidder firm’s operating performance and 
the bidder experiences significant internalization benefits from technological know-how 
when cultural distance is great. Long-run calendar-time returns further support this 
finding. These results add to the existing literature by highlighting the importance of 
cultural distance when examining internalization benefits. 
In chapter two I attempt to explain abnormal bidder firms’ returns in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions by comparing the first-mover hypothesis to the late-mover 
hypothesis. I also study the reactions of rival firms to bidder firm announcements as a 
further test of the first-mover hypothesis. The findings suggest that cross-border 
acquisitions are generally value-destroying for strategic pioneers unless cultural distance 
between the U.S. and the target country is great. Further, I find positive announcement 
effects for followers as long as cultural distance is small.
1Chapter 1
How Does National Culture Impact Internalization Benefits in Cross-Border 
Mergers and Acquisitions? 
1.1. Introduction
During the past decade, acquisitions of foreign target firms have gained in popularity. 
Announcements, such as the acquisition of German-based Wella AG by Procter and 
Gamble for €4.65 billion in 2004, have become part of the regular business news. The 
World Investment Report 2007, issued by the United Nations, reported continuous 
increases in cross-border M&A activities, with a value of $880 billion in 2006 (p. 5). 
Given the increasing importance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, we have a 
vested interest in learning more about this exciting area. To date, empirical evidence on 
bidder firm returns in cross-border acquisitions provides mixed results. On average, U.S. 
bidder firms earn non-significant returns during the traditional 2-day announcement 
period of a cross-border M&A (Bruner (2004)). However, some studies have identified 
certain bidder characteristics that are associated with positive announcement returns. For 
example, Morck and Yeung (1992) examine cross-border M&As and find persistent 
positive abnormal announcement effects for bidder firms that possess substantial 
intangible assets. The authors thereby provide support for the internalization hypothesis, 
which suggests that firms might wish to export their intangible assets beyond domestic 
borders if the acquisition is beneficial and less costly than writing contracts (e.g. license 
and franchise agreements). The two types of intangible assets most frequently referred to 
in the internalization literature are technological know-how, proxied by research and 
development (R&D) expenditure, and marketing expertise, proxied by advertisement 
expense (see Morck and Yeung (1991, 1992)). Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005) 
extend the test of the internalization hypothesis by conducting a long-run study. They 
utilize a dummy variable to proxy for R&D-related intangible assets, and find that U.K. 
bidder firms that acquire foreign private targets experience significantly positive 36-
month abnormal returns. However, the long-term performance of U.K. bidders that 
acquire foreign public firms is not significant.
In addition to research that examines the internalization theory, a separate research 
stream focuses on the impact of cultural differences between bidder and target countries 
on the bidder firm’s wealth position. Cultural differences have previously been proxied 
by religion (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999)), language (Stulz 
and Williamson (2003)), and law (Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2005)). The most 
recent literature, however, has recognized the value of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
(Licht et al. (2005), and Benou, Gleason, and Madura (2007)). In his seminal work, 
2Hofstede (1980) surveyed more than 100,000 IBM employees from subsidiaries in more 
than 50 countries between 1967 and 1973. He found four distinct cultural dimensions: 
Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism (IDV), Masculinity (MAS), and Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index (UAI). These cultural dimensions allow us to measure the similarity 
between national cultures. 
The empirical evidence on whether the impact of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions on 
bidder firm returns is positive or negative is inconclusive. On the one hand, Conn et al. 
(2005) find significantly positive announcement returns when the cultural difference is 
great between U.K. bidder firms and foreign target firms. Also, when controlling for 
factors such as bidder size, corporate governance, and method of payment (Chakrabarti, 
Jayaraman, and Mukherjee (2008)) as well as industry relatedness of the acquisition, year 
dummies, and industry dummies (Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998)), studies find a 
positive relation between cultural distance and bidder firm abnormal returns. In support 
of this positive relationship, researchers suggest that cross-border M&As provide access 
to valuable new routines and repertoires (Morosini et al. (1998)) and face less integration 
difficulties when the target firm remains autonomous (Chakrabarti et al. (2008)). On the 
other hand, Datta and Puia (1995) find a negative relation between bidder firm return and 
cultural difference when examining announcement effects on their sample of U.S. bidder 
firms. They attribute their result to increased acquisition costs that result from manager 
resistance, trust issues, and post-acquisition integration. Conn et al. (2005) confirm this 
negative relation for U.K. bidder firms that acquire publicly held foreign targets. 
To date, the finance literature has shown evidence that cultural differences between 
bidder and target countries significantly impact bidder firm performance. In addition, the 
literature has clearly linked intangible-intensive U.S. bidder firms with significantly
positive announcement returns in cross-border M&As. However, the internalization 
literature has not accounted for the impact that cultural environments of bidder and target 
countries have on the benefits that arise to bidder firms from internalizing intangible-
related advantages. 
The purpose of this study is to link these two research streams - that is, internalization 
theory and cultural dimensions - to shed light on the effect that culture has on the benefits 
of internalization in cross-border M&As. In particular, we examine how cultural distance 
influences announcement returns of bidder firms that possess technological know-how 
compared to marketing expertise. Due to the fact that technological know-how is more 
product-specific while marketing expertise is more location-specific, cultural differences 
might impact internalization benefits differently depending on the type of intangible asset 
the bidder firm possesses. Further, we address the joint effects of internalization and 
cultural differences between bidder and target countries in the long-run. Although Conn 
et al. (2005) provide insightful initial results on the separate effects of internalization and 
cultural distance on long-run bidder firm performance, it has yet to be determined how 
culture impacts internalization benefits in the long-run. Therefore, we move beyond 
simply comparing the impacts of high R&D expenditures and cultural distance on long-
run bidder firm returns. Rather, we attempt to uncover how cultural distance affects the 
long-run performance of bidder firms depending on their levels of intangible assets. We 
further extend Conn et al.’s (2005) approach by looking at U.S. bidder firms instead of 
U.K. bidder firms, by utilizing a more appropriate use of Hofstede’s measures of cultural 
3distance, and by incorporating a continuous measure of R&D level rather than a dummy 
variable. In addition, we add advertisement expense as a proxy for marketing expertise –
that is, a second important intangible asset - to examine internalization benefits. The 
results of this study have important value implications for investors and firm managers 
alike because they learn how cultural differences impact a bidder firm’s wealth 
depending on the type and level of intangible assets the firm possesses.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, 
Section 3 describes the hypotheses to be tested, Section 4 discusses the research 
methodology and data utilized to test the proposed hypotheses, Section 5 presents the 
empirical results, Section 6 states the study’s conclusion, and Section 7 provides future 
research possibilities.
1.2. Literature Review
1.2.1. Internationalization Theory
The internationalization hypothesis suggests that possessing intangible assets creates 
value in foreign direct investment (FDI). This theory is based on the work of Hymer 
(1960, 1976), Buckley and Casson (1976, 1985), and Rugman (1989, 1991), among 
others.
In his seminal work, Hymer (1960) suggests that multinational corporations (MNCs) 
operating overseas face greater costs, such as communication and managerial expenses, 
compared to host country competitors. Therefore, if MNCs succeed overseas despite 
language barriers, cultural differences, and others costs created by operating in unfamiliar 
market conditions, they must possess some inherent advantages. Morck and Yeung 
(1992) find empirical evidence for such inherent advantages in the form of information-
based intangible assets. They compare such intangible assets as technological know-how, 
marketing ability, and effective management to public goods because their value is 
expected to increase as firms expand their international operations. In their sample of 322 
cross-border acquisitions by U.S. firms between 1978 and 1988, only firms that possess
information-based intangible assets earn positive abnormal stock returns during the 
acquisition announcement period. Morck and Yeung (1992) conclude that international 
diversification is on average value destroying unless firms own considerable amounts of
intangible assets in form of technological know-how or advertisement expertise.
One major reason why firms with intangible assets engage in cross-border 
acquisitions rather than alternative modes of entry into the foreign market, such as 
franchising or licensing, is to reduce moral hazard costs. As Williamson (1975, 1985) 
notes, whenever agents cannot costlessly write complete contracts that cover all possible 
outcomes, trading partners might face opportunities to exploit existing loopholes. 
Following this argument, contracts between a domestic firm and foreign market 
representatives are incomplete and present moral hazard problems, because it is too 
costly or impossible to devise and enforce a contract that completely prevents the foreign 
market representative from defecting. Foreign representatives, for example, might be in 
the position to unilaterally terminate contracts and utilize the newly obtained knowledge 
4in their own production facilities without properly compensating former trading partners. 
In addition to the moral hazard cost, it may be difficult for contract partners to agree on 
the true value of the traded asset, especially if it is an intangible asset such as 
technological know-how or marketing expertise. Consequently, when it is less costly to 
expand intangible assets into a foreign market through acquisition instead of contracting, 
firms will choose to engage in cross-border M&As. Firms will therefore internalize 
intangible assets as long as it lowers transactions costs and provides efficiency benefits 
(Buckley (1988)).   
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) find empirical support for the internalization theory in 
their study of 1,273 cross-border acquisitions of U.S. targets between 1970 and 1987. 
They find that, compared to domestic acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions take place 
more frequently in R&D intensive industries and that acquirer and target firms operate 
typically in related industries. Additional empirical evidence shows that high levels of 
intangible assets positively impact the market value of a multinational firm (Morck and 
Yeung (1991)). Utilizing a sample of 1,644 corporations and their 1978 data, Morck and 
Yeung (1991) regress firm value, as measured by Tobin’s q, on firm size, R&D spending, 
advertising spending, and leverage. Given that multinational corporations tend to be 
larger than domestic firms, the authors choose firm size as a proxy for the firm’s degree 
of multinationality. R&D expense proxies for technical expertise and advertising 
spending for consumer goodwill; both represent a measure of intangible assets. The 
regression result suggests that R&D and advertising spending positively affect a firm’s 
market value as the firm becomes more multinational. Multinationality alone does not 
seem to impact firm value in this study. Therefore, the authors conclude that intangible 
assets drive the value in multinational firms. This is consistent with the internalization 
theory. 
In addition to the regressions, Morck and Yeung (1992) conduct an event study and 
regress bidder firms’ abnormal returns on intangible assets. This is the first event study 
that tests the internalization hypothesis, and the results support the hypothesis. The result 
of the 1-day abnormal announcement effect of 322 U.S.-based firms that acquired foreign 
targets during 1978 and 1988 provides evidence that bidder firm shareholders earn, on 
average, a significantly positive announcement return of 0.29 percent if the bidder firm 
owns intangible assets. It appears that smaller firms with more technological know-how
experience greater abnormal returns than larger firms that possess more marketing 
expertise. The authors further find a positive relation between abnormal returns and 
manager ownership, and a negative relation between abnormal return and entrenchment. 
Although stock financing of domestic M&As is associated with a negative abnormal 
announcement effect for the bidder firm (Travlos (1987)), the effect in this cross-border 
sample is not significant.
1.2.2. The Influence of Culture on Cross-Border M&As
While the term “culture” is frequently used in our everyday lives, we do not have an 
exact definition for it. Webster’s Dictionary defines culture as “all the knowledge and 
values shared by a society.” The importance of culture has been recognized in numerous 
disciplines in the past, and it has been recently introduced into the financial research 
5arena. The challenge that researchers face when including culture into their analyses is to 
find the appropriate proxy to measure it.
Yeniyurt and Townsend (2003) suggest that nationality can proxy well for culture, 
where nationality consists of language, history and religion. They note that although 
some nations host diverse cultural groups, they all share common ideas about their 
identity, institutional systems, and worldview, which guarantee the nation’s survival. 
Belgium, for example, is divided into two regions; Flanders in the north where people 
speak Flemish, and Walloonia in the south with French as the official language. Though 
the two cultural groups do not usually share universities, common media, or memberships 
to scientific organizations, the country is united with respect to politics and federal 
government as well as economic goals and national currency.  
Stulz and Williamson (2003) examine how well common proxies for culture explain 
differences in investor rights among countries. Following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1999) who use religion to proxy for culture, Stulz and Williamson (2003)
find that a country’s primary religion proxies better for creditor rights than language, 
legal system, and other previously used variables. In particular the authors find that 
creditors enjoy better protection in Protestant countries than in Catholic countries. The 
authors suggest that the Catholic faith is established on clerical knowledge and strict 
hierarchy within the church that consequently created a uniform structure. This concept 
of centralized leadership also spread into the legal system of catholic countries. Under the 
common law in these countries, power to interpret the law is given to the judge and 
judgments are derived based on case-specific circumstances. The protestants, on the other 
hand, believe in individualism, which fostered an environment where creditors gained 
protection against losses and the right to sue against defaulting debtors. Under the civil 
law of Protestant countries, all laws are clearly written down with specific repercussions 
upon their violation. Judges in civil law countries merely execute the law’s implications 
rather than imputing their own interpretation of the law.
Licht et al. (2005) question the usefulness of religion as a proxy for culture. Religion 
typically only distinguishes between the Protestant and non-Protestant faith and is 
therefore not able to account for variation in national culture. Instead of utilizing religion, 
Licht et al. (2005) examine the relation between a country’s legal rules and its culture. In 
particular, the authors focus on how well investor protection laws, as outlined by La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishney (1998), can predict national culture. To 
measure culture, Licht et al. (2005) utilize Schwartz (1994) and Hofstede (1980) cultural 
value dimensions. The findings indicate that English-speaking countries exhibit close 
relations between their investor rights and national culture. However, the same does not 
hold for all countries. Licht et al. (2005) note that while some countries adopted legal 
systems voluntarily, other countries were forced into legal rules of occupying powers. It 
is therefore not surprising to observe countries within the same legal family that differ 
significantly in their cultural values. 
The recent finance literature has recognized another proxy to measure culture, 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Benou et al. (2007); Licht et al. (2005)). For his seminal 
work, Hofstede (1980) surveyed more than 100,000 IBM employees from subsidiaries in 
more than 50 countries between 1967 and 1973. From this survey, Hofstede developed 
cultural dimensions that allow us to measure how similar or dissimilar different national 
6cultures are (Hofstede (1980)). Raw scores for 56 countries are available for the 
following four main cultural dimensions: Power Distance (PDI), Individualism (IDV), 
Masculinity (MAS), and Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI). Power Distance (PDI) describes 
the extent to which people accept inequality in a country’s society.1 Austria ranks lowest 
in the PDI category while Malaysia ranks highest, next to Guatemala, and Panama. 
Individualism (IDV) measures a culture’s focus on individual rights compared to 
collective group-oriented behavior. The U.S., the United Kingdom, and Australia rank 
among the most individuality-oriented countries, while South American and Asian 
countries rank among the most collective-oriented countries. Masculinity (MAS) 
indicates whether a country is male dominated and focused on achievement, control and 
power structure. Japan and Hungary are the most male-dominated countries, while 
Sweden and Norway treat women most equally. Finally, Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) 
focuses on the degree of ambiguity that a country feels comfortable facing. This measure 
is displayed in the country’s laws and regulations which are either more or less well 
defined. Greece and Portugal are the most rule-based countries with low uncertainty, 
while Singapore, Jamaica, and Denmark are the most risk-loving countries. With the help 
of cluster analysis, Hofstede grouped countries into the following cultural regions: Anglo, 
Germanic, Nordic, More Developed Latin, Less Developed Latin, More Developed Asian 
(consisting only of Japan), Less Developed Asian, and Near Eastern. 
Studies that utilize Hofstede’s cultural dimensions find mixed evidence pertaining to 
the impact of cultural distance on the performance of cross-border acquisitions. On the 
one hand, research suggests that greater cultural difference between two countries creates 
negative wealth effects for bidder firms’ shareholders (Datta and Puia (1995)). Possible 
reasons are increased acquisition costs due to manager resistance, trust issues, and post-
acquisition integration (Datta and Puia (1995)). On the other hand, when controlling for 
other factors such as bidder size, corporate governance, and method of payment 
(Chakrabarti et al. (2008)) as well as industry relatedness of the acquisition, year 
dummies, and industry dummies (Morosini et al. (1998)), researchers find a positive 
relation between bidder firm wealth effects and cultural distance (Morosini et al. (1998); 
and Chakrabari et al. (2004)). A possible explanation for this finding is that cross-border 
M&As facilitate the transfer of valuable new routines and repertoires between culturally 
diverse countries (Morosini et al. (1998)). It is also possible to minimize integration costs 
by allowing the target firm to continue its operations under great autonomous control 
(Chakrabari et al. (2004)).
1.2.3. Empirical Evidence on Short-Run Performance in Cross-Border M&As
Bruner (2004) summarizes the results of announcement wealth effects to bidder 
firms’ shareholders in 14 cross-border M&A studies. Five of these studies focus on U.S. 
firms bidding on foreign firms and their findings over a 2-day announcement window 
indicate on average non-significant cumulative abnormal returns. For example, Biswas, 
Fraser and Mahajan (1999) compare the results of cross-border M&As with domestic 
mergers. Their sample consists of 171 financial institutions that announced cross-border 
M&As between 1977 and 1987, as well as a matched control sample that accounts for 
domestic M&As. In support of the diversification theory, the authors find significantly 
7negative announcement returns to bidder firms in domestic acquisitions. However, the 
announcement returns to bidder firms in cross-border M&As are not significant. Further, 
firms that go abroad for the first time do not earn significant returns on the announcement 
date (Doukas and Travlos (1988)). 
Non-U.S. bidders exhibit similar, mostly non-significant results (Bruner (2004)). 
However, Conn and Connell (1990) find significant negative abnormal announcement 
returns for non-U.S. bidder firms in cross-border M&As between 1971 and 1980. 
Negative announcement effects to U.S. bidder firms in cross-border M&As have also 
been observed and are associated with acquisitions of target firms that operate in a 
different industry than the bidder firm (Markides and Ittner (1994)) and acquisitions of 
Canadian target firms (Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000); and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000)). 
Besides insignificant and negative bidder firms’ announcement returns, other studies 
find positive wealth effects. In the case of a small sample of 16 Japanese bidder firms that 
acquired U.S. target firms during 1981 and 1991, Pettway, Sicherman and Speiss (1993) 
report positive and significant abnormal announcement returns for the bidder firms. 
Positive announcement returns are also observed in cross-border M&As with U.S. bidder 
firms. For example, Doukas and Travlos (1988) examine 301 cross-border acquisitions 
by U.S. firms during 1975 and 1983. They find that bidder firm shareholders of 
multinational firms realize significant positive abnormal announcement returns of 0.31 
percent if they do not already operate in the target country and it is not their first time 
going abroad. Looking at their entire sample of cross-border M&As, Doukas and Travlos 
(1988) further show that bidder firm shareholders’ 2-day announcement returns are 
positively impacted when their firm moves into a less developed target country. Markides 
and Ittner (1994) follow the Doukas and Travlos (1988) approach when looking at 276 
cases of foreign acquisitions by U.S. bidder firms between 1975 and 1988. The bidder 
shareholder cumulative abnormal return in their study is positive at 0.32 percent for the 
two days surrounding the announcement, significant at the 10 percent level, and positive 
at 0.54 percent for a 5-day window, significant at the 5 percent level. Contrary to Doukas 
and Travlos (1988), this study indicates that related acquisitions create greater bidder 
shareholder abnormal returns. In addition, the regression analysis suggests that bidder 
firms’ gains are positively related to advertising intensity (but not to R&D intensity), 
target size, oligopolistic industries, U.S. dollar strength, and previous international 
experience. The authors therefore conclude that cross-border M&As, on average, provide 
wealth increase for bidder firms. Cash payments instead of stock payments or a mix of 
payment methods (Biswas et al. (1999)) and foreign target purchases in Germany, Italy 
and Switzerland (Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000)) further tend to increase the bidder 
firm’s announcement returns. 
1.2.4. Empirical Evidence on Long-Run Performance in Cross-Border M&As
Long-run analysis in cross-border M&As has only recently been explored and the 
findings so far are inconclusive. For example, Black, Cannes and Jandik (2001) examine 
the long run abnormal return of 361 U.S. bidder firms in cross-border M&As for one, 
three, and five years. The targets were acquired between 1985 and 1995. Following the 
buy-and-hold methodology suggested in Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), the authors 
8minimize the new listing, rebalancing, and skewness biases and find on average 
significantly negative abnormal returns during the three and five years following the 
M&A. They also show that bidder firm returns are negatively related to target 
acquisitions that are financed with stock payment, which is line with Lougrhran and Vijh 
(1997).
Aw and Chatterjee (2004) confirm the negative bidder firm returns in the long run. 
They examine 41 cross-border mergers of U.K. bidders and U.S. and continental 
European targets during 1991 and 1996. Concentrating on M&As in excess of $400 
million, the authors find significantly negative long-run bidder firm abnormal returns that 
increase with time. Utilizing a simple market model to estimate the abnormal returns, 
these returns range from -4.46 percent over a 6-months post-event window to -24.40 
percent over a 2-year post-event window. Results under the adjusted market model are 
slightly lower but they follow the same trend. The authors did not find differences in 
abnormal returns based on observation periods. Among other reasons, Aw and Chatterjee 
(2004) suggest that differences in culture might cause this negative bidder abnormal 
return. 
Chakrabarti et al. (2008) provide additional support for negative bidder firm returns 
in the long run. They focus primarily on the long-run (30 and 36 month) abnormal bidder 
firm return of cross-border M&As. Their sample consists of 405 international M&As 
between 1991 and 2000. Utilizing the buy-and-hold methodology, they find significant 
negative abnormal returns that increase in magnitude between 12 (-0.049 percent) to 36 
months (-0.149 percent) after the effective acquisition date. Contrary to Conn et al.
(2005), Chakrabarti et al. (2008) find that bidder firms benefit from cross-border M&As 
in the long-run if the bidder and target firms are from different cultural environments. 
When using Hofstede’s cultural difference measures separately instead of an index, the 
authors find that only power distance is positively related with abnormal return. The 
Hofstede index for cultural distance is not significant during the announcement of the 
M&A where the authors find a positive and significant abnormal return of 0.714 percent 
over a 3-day window. 
Besides the empirical evidence for negative wealth effects of cross-border M&As in 
the long-run, studies have also found positive implications of cross-border M&As for the 
bidder firm in the long-run. For example, Black et al. (2001) find positive relations 
between abnormal returns and book value of assets as well as market-to-book value. 
Conn et al. (2005) examine a total of 4,000 M&As by U.K. bidders between 1984 and 
1998, of which 1,140 are cross-border acquisitions. The 3-day announcement return in 
cross-border M&As, measured utilizing standard event study methodology, is 
insignificant for the entire cross-border sample but significantly positive when the target 
is a privately held firm. The authors apply calendar-time methodology and find that the 3-
year post acquisition return is significantly negative with -32 percent, but not 
significantly different from zero when the target is privately held. Different from Black et 
al. (2001), Conn et al. (2005) find no impact of method of payment on the abnormal 
return. Compared with domestic M&As, cross-border activities perform better and result 
in less negative abnormal return. The authors find no significance with La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny’s (2000) legal systems, accounting standards, different 
tax treatments, and differences in exchange rates during the announcement. However, the 
9authors did find support for the internalization theory because high-tech firms that are 
involved in a cross-border M&A create positive announcement and long-run returns, 
while M&As with non-high-tech firms create no announcement effects and negative 
long-run returns. The authors further find evidence of the importance of Hofstede’s 
cultural difference measures, as abnormal returns increase with less cultural differences 
between bidder and target country. Risk diversification and currency strength do not 
appear to be factors that impact announcement or long-run returns. 
Clearly, the findings of the impact of cultural distance on the long-term performance 
are not yet conclusive and require additional examination. Also, so far we have not 
determined how cultural distance between bidder and target countries impacts the wealth 
effects of bidder firms with intangible assets. This study will add to the existing literature 
by testing how cultural distance influences the internalization hypothesis in cross-border 
M&As. 
1.3. Hypotheses
According to Bruner’s (2004) summary on short-run bidder returns in cross-border 
M&As, U.S. bidder firms, on average, earn non-significant abnormal announcement 
returns. We expect therefore to find insignificant abnormal announcement returns in our 
full sample that includes U.S. bidder firms that acquired non-U.S. targets during our 
sample period. However, we anticipate positive abnormal announcement returns to U.S. 
bidder firms that invest significantly in R&D or advertisement, as suggested by the 
internalization hypothesis (see Morck and Yeung (1992)). 
We contribute to the literature by linking the internalization theory with Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural dimensions and examine how culture impacts the internalization benefit 
in cross-border M&As. For this purpose, we divide a bidder firm’s intangible assets into 
technological know-how, proxied by R&D expense, and marketing expertise, proxied by 
advertisement expenditure. We examine these intangible assets separately and observe 
what impact culture has on bidder firms’ returns depending on what type of intangible 
asset they possess. Technological know-how is a product specific asset that does not 
substantially dependent on the local market. Therefore, technological know-how should 
be easily transferable between countries. Marketing expertise, on the other hand, is a 
market specific asset. Consequently, a marketing oriented firm may wish to expand only 
into countries where it can utilize its expertise and choose target countries with similar 
market environments. 
The impact of culture on the internalization benefit for firms with technological 
know-how can be twofold. Similar to Morosini et al. (1998), we might observe a positive 
relationship between cultural distance and bidder firm announcement effect if it is 
beneficial to internalize the intangible assets between culturally different countries. This 
is plausible if contracting (e.g. licensing and franchising) is less expensive in culturally 
similar climates. If this is true, an increasing difference between two countries’ cultures is 
likely to make contracting more costly and the purchase of a foreign company more 
attractive. The benefits from internalization, therefore, could increase with cultural 
distance.
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Hypothesis 1a: Cultural distance between target and bidder countries should 
positively affect the announcement return for bidder firms with high levels of 
technological know-how if it is beneficial to internalize the intangible assets 
between culturally different countries.
On the other hand, if the bidder firm owns technological know-how that it wishes to 
internalize among more than only the domestic market, it is reasonable to assume that 
bidder firm and target firm have to work together closely and integrate the target firm 
successfully. Because countries cultivate organization styles and administration routines 
based on their national culture (Kogut and Singh (1988)), integration would be much 
easier to accomplish if bidder firm and target firm share similar norms and values. 
Following this rationale, Datta and Puia (1995) imply that less cultural distance eases 
post-acquisition integration of the target firm. Thus, we could also observe a negative 
relation between cultural distance and bidder announcement effects.
Hypothesis 1b: Cultural distance between target and bidder countries should 
negatively affect the announcement return for bidder firms with high levels of 
technological know-how if cultural distance increases the cost of post-acquisition 
integration of the target firm.
The second type of intangible asset that is important in the internalization literature is 
marketing expertise. Because marketing strength is based on a firm’s expertise about the 
home market, firms might find it easiest to internalize this intangible among foreign 
markets with similar cultural backgrounds. When a firm’s core advantage stems from 
marketing expertise, it might be too costly to enter dissimilar cultural environments. In 
this situation we expect to find a negative relation between cultural distance and bidder 
firm return for advertisement-strong bidders. 
Hypothesis 2a: Cultural distance between target and bidder countries should 
negatively affect the announcement return for bidder firms with high levels of 
marketing expertise if it is less costly to internalize this intangible asset among 
markets with similar cultural backgrounds.
On the other hand, it is also conceivable that firms with strong marketing expertise 
benefit from greater cultural distance because this platform allows them to differentiate 
themselves from competition. Firms with less marketing expertise are likely to compete 
domestically and in countries with similar culture, but they are less likely to have the 
resources to adapt to a market with a different culture. In addition, it is feasible that local 
marketing in the target country is less sophisticated if countries with great cultural 
distance are primarily developing countries. Therefore, firms with superior marketing 
expertise might find it more beneficial to transfer their intangible asset into markets with 
greater cultural differences.
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Hypothesis 2b: Cultural distance between target and bidder countries should 
positively affect the announcement return for bidder firms with high levels of 
marketing expertise if this intangible asset provides them with a competitive 
advantage relative to the competition from their home countries and/or the target 
country. 
In the long-run, studies provide evidence of significantly negative bidder firm returns 
(see Aw and Chatterjee (2004); and Black et al. (2001)). This observation is due to 
difficulties in predicting future earnings from targets with dissimilar accounting standards 
(Black et al. (2001)), difficulties in valuing synergy effects (Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2004)), and difference in culture (Aw and Chatterjee (2004)), among other reasons. 
However, Conn et al. (2005) find positive long-run returns in cross-border M&As when 
the bidder is a high-tech firm. This provides support for the internalization hypothesis in 
the long-run. As a further test of the internalization hypothesis, we expect that the long-
run bidder returns for firms with high levels of intangibles are non-negative.
Hypothesis 3: The long-run performance of U.S. bidders with high levels of 
intangibles in cross-border takeovers should be non-negative.
We further contribute to the literature by linking the internalization theory with 
Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions and examine how culture impacts the long-run 
internalization benefit in cross-border M&As. Similar to our predictions for the 
announcement period, we expect the long-run returns of bidder firms with high levels of 
technological know-how to be either positive or negative.
Hypothesis 4a: Cultural distance between target and bidder countries should 
positively affect the long-run return for bidder firms with high levels of 
technological know-how if it is beneficial to internalize the intangible assets 
between culturally different countries.
Hypothesis 4b: Cultural distance between target and bidder countries should 
negatively affect the long-run return for bidder firms with high levels of 
technological know-how if less cultural distance eases post-acquisition 
integration of the target firm.
The second type of intangible asset, marketing expertise, might be easiest internalized 
among foreign markets with similar cultural backgrounds. Similar to the announcement 
effect, we expect to find a negative relation between cultural distance and bidder firm 
long-run return for advertisement-strong bidders if it is too costly to enter dissimilar 
cultural environments. Alternatively, marketing expertise can provide the firm with a 
competitive advantage that is most valuable in countries with great cultural distance.
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Hypothesis 5a: Cultural distance between target and bidder countries should 
negatively affect the long-run operating performance for bidder firms with high 
levels of marketing expertise if it is less costly to internalize this intangible asset 
among markets with similar cultural backgrounds.
Hypothesis 5b: Cultural distance between target and bidder countries should 
positively affect the long-run operating performance for bidder firms with high 
levels of marketing expertise if this intangible asset provides them with a 
competitive advantage relative to the competition from their home countries 
and/or the target country. 
1.4. Data and Methodology
1.4.1. Sample Description
Our sample consists of 468 U.S. publicly traded firms that announced and completed 
cross-border M&As during 1987 and 2004. All sample firms and their announcement 
dates are obtained from Thomson Financials SDC Platinum database. To be included in 
the sample
(1) The announcement dates was confirmed using the Wall Street Journal or the 
Lexis-Nexis News Wire file.
(2) Appropriate stock and firm information was available on the Center for 
Research and Security Prices (CRSP) files and the Compustat database.
(3) Following André, Kooli and L’Her (2004) and others, the transaction values 
for the cross-border deals are greater than $10 million, which eliminates small 
acquisitions without significant economic implications from our data set. 
(4) All takeovers reflect at least majority stake acquisition of the target firm.
(5) Similar to Fee and Thomas (2004), we exclude public utility firms (SIC code 
4900-4999) and financial institutions (SIC code 6000-6999) from the sample 
because those industries are heavily regulated.
We collect additional data on exchange rates from the Federal Reserve Bank, and bidder 
firms’ involvement overseas from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. The 
observations for the dependent variables in our sample are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1 percent to adjust for outliers. 
Table 1.1 explains the variables used in the paper’s analyses. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 
describe the distribution of the cross-border M&A announcements by target country and 
announcement year. Specifically, Table 1.2 indicates that more than half of all acquired 
target firms are from the United Kingdom (26.5%), Canada (16.5%), and Germany 
(10.0%). The cultural distance between the U.S. and these target countries is noticeably 
low at 0.08, 0.13, and 0.44, respectively. At the same time, U.S. firms acquire targets in 
countries with high cultural distance very infrequently during the same sample period. 
Some of the highest cultural dimensions measures are 8.07 for Iceland (1 acquisition), 
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4.24 for Portugal (1 acquisition), and 4.13 for the Russian Federation (3 acquisitions). 
The apparent negative correlation between frequency and cultural distance is highly 
significant with -0.45. 
Table 1.3 exhibits our sample’s distribution of cross-border M&A announcements by 
year. The number of acquisitions in our sample begins to increase notably in 1995, with 
about 85 percent of the overall observations occurring in the last ten years of our sample 
period. The increase in cross-border acquisitions in our sample is in line with Black 
(2000) who states that an international merger wave began in 1993. The years with the 
highest number of announcements are 2000 (13.89%), 1998 (11.32%), and 2004 (9.62%). 
Table 1.4 provides descriptive statistics for the announcing bidder firms. On average, 
U.S. firms spend more money on research and development than on advertising. Of all 
announcements, 43 percent have previous announcements in the sample, 68 percent have 
previous international experience, 62 percent have previous experience in either the target 
country or the target country’s regional area, and 33 percent have previous experience in 
the actual target country. A vast majority (78 percent) of all acquisitions are financed 
using cash rather than stock or other forms of payment. Further, 11 percent of all 
acquisitions are for target firms in developing countries, and 36 percent of all acquisitions 
are in the same industry, where bidder and target firms share the same 4-digit SIC code.  
The variability for R&D expenses, advertisement expenses, cultural distance, size, and 
bidder profitability is relatively low, whereas the variability for the difference of gross 
domestic income between the U.S. and the target country as well as the strength of the 
U.S. dollar relative to the foreign currency varies noticeably. 
1.4.2. Short-Run Performance
We utilize standard event study methodology to obtain the bidder firms’ 
announcement returns. This model estimates the abnormal return for Security i on Day t, 
AR
it
, by subtracting the security’s expected return, E(R
it
), from its actual return, R
it
. The 
expected return is estimated using Fama’s (1976) market model.
E(R
it
) = α
i 
+ β
i 
R
mt (1)
AR
it 
= R
it 
– E(R
it
) (2)
The estimated parameters α
i 
and β
i 
in Equation (1) are obtained using an OLS regression 
of security returns, R
it
, with market returns, R
mt
, during the estimation period, where R
mt 
is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index to proxy for the market index on Day t. 
Our estimation period used in the OLS regression spans from Day -300 to Day -50, where 
Day 0 denotes the event day – that is, the day on which the cross-border M&A is 
announced. 
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1.4.3. Long-Run Performance
Our tests for long-run performance are divided into two sections. First, we examine 
the long-run abnormal stock return by employing the calendar-time portfolio approach as 
first introduced by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) and later applied and enhanced by 
Fama (1998), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Khotari and Warner (2005). Next, we 
examine the long-run operating performance, following Fee and Thomas (2004).
1.4.3.1. Calendar-Time Portfolio Approach
In the short-run, “methodologies based on the OLS market model and using standard 
parametric tests are well-specified” (Brown and Warner (1985), p. 25). However, in the 
long-run, even slight errors in calculating the beta risk to obtain the expected returns can 
result in significant economic differences when calculating the abnormal returns. Two 
methodologies that have been developed to provide more reliable results are the buy-and-
hold methodology as advocated by Lyon et al. (1999), among others and the calendar-
time portfolio approach as supported by Mitchell and Stafford (2000), p.308, among 
others. While both methodologies perform well in random samples, they suffer from 
misspecifications in nonrandom samples and can cause the study of long-run abnormal 
returns to be “treacherous” (Lyon et al. (1999)). One problem inherent in the buy-and-
hold approach is the violation of the independence assumption due to overlapping return 
periods that causes test statistics to be misspecified (Lyon et al. (1999)). The calendar-
time portfolio approach overcomes this issue. “By forming event portfolios, the cross-
sectional correlations of the individual event firm returns are automatically accounted for 
in the portfolio variance at each point in calendar time” (Mitchell and Stafford (2000)). 
Because the calendar-time portfolio methodology does not require independence between 
the abnormal returns, we proceed with this approach.
Following Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Lyon et al. (1999), we calculate the 
monthly portfolio returns of our bidder firms that acquired non-US targets within 12 
months prior to each particular calendar month. We repeat this procedure to also obtain 
portfolio returns of firms that acquired a foreign target firm within the past 36 and 60 
months. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly, where bidder firms are dropped 12, 36, or 
60 months after the M&A, and bidder firms that just purchased a foreign target are added. 
We eliminate returns of firms that have more than one M&A within the event period. The 
calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns are determined by regressing the abnormal 
portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model:
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp(Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept       (3)
In this regression, Rpt is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (portfolios are 
built equally weighted, EW, and value weighted, VW), Rft is the monthly risk-free return 
as measured by the 3-month T-bill rate, Rmt is the monthly return on the market index as 
measured by the VW CRSP index, SMBt is the difference between returns of portfolios 
of small and big firms, and HMLt is the difference between returns of portfolios of high 
book-to-market (BM) stocks and low BM stocks. ap, bp, sp, and hp are the regression’s 
parameter estimates. The intercept ap is of special importance because it measures the 
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average monthly abnormal portfolio return. If the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor 
model can explain the portfolio excess return, then the intercept should yield a value of 
zero. Values significantly different from zero consequently represent abnormal returns. 
We repeat the long-run stock return calculation for the sub-sample of bidder firms 
that exhibit significant R&D expenses and also for bidder firms that exhibit significant 
advertisement expenditures. To determine significant R&D and advertisement expenses, 
we find the median R&D and advertisement expenses for each involved industry, and 
classify firms with R&D and advertisement expenses above their industry median as 
possessing significant amounts of intangible assets. 
1.4.3.2. Operating Performance
We follow Fee and Thomas (2004) when measuring operating performance. The 
performance measure is calculated by dividing cash flows (Compustat item 13) by sales 
(Compustat item 12). We compare the sample firms’ operating performance to the 
performance measures of each involved industry, obtained from Compustat. While Fee 
and Thomas (2004) compare after-M&A operating performances to pre-M&A operating 
performances (comprised of bidder firm and target firm cash-flow to asset ratios), we are 
only interested in the bidder firm’s performance up to three years after the acquisition. 
We want to examine the long-term operating performance after the cross-border M&A. 
Considering that the integration of a new target firm into the overall firm structure 
requires some time, it seems reasonable to focus on the operating performance of the 
combined firm from the year of the M&A until three years into the future.
1.4.4. Cross-Sectional Regression
We regress the abnormal stock returns of the short-run and long-run on explanatory 
variables. Specifically we test whether the abnormal returns of our complete bidder firm 
portfolios are positively related with R&D and advertisement expenses. A positive 
relation, especially in the long-run, would further strengthen the internalization 
hypothesis and extend Morck and Yeung’s (1991, 1992) short-run evidence. 
We continue to test whether the abnormal stock returns of bidder firms with 
significant R&D and advertisement expenses are related to Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
distance measure. Following Kogut and Sing (1988), we combine Hofstede’s four most 
common cultural dimensions, which are individualism (IDV), uncertainty avoidance
 (UAI), power distance (PDI) and masculinity (MAS), into one distance measure.
Hofstede’s Cultural Distance Measure = 
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Here SBi is the bidder country score for Dimension i, STi is the target country score for 
Dimension i, and Vi is the variance of the index score of Dimension i.
2 When we divide 
our results for the cultural distance measure into high and low cultural distance between 
the target country and the United States, our grouping corresponds with that of Benou, 
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Gleason, and Madura (2007) who categorize cultural distance using hierarchical cluster 
analysis. 
1.4.5. Control Variables
Following the previous research, we control for the most commonly used variables. 
These control variables are included both in the cross-sectional regression of the 
announcement effect and the long-run abnormal operating results. We control for the 
following variables:
Size Indicates bidder firm's size as measured by the natural logarithm of the 
firm's total assets. This information is obtained from Compustat.
Cash Takes the value of 1.0 if the transaction is completely financed by cash 
payment, and zero otherwise. We typically observe positive relations 
between cash payments and wealth gains to both bidder and target firms 
(see for example Harris and Ravenscraft (1991)). The variable information 
is obtained from the SDC database.
Exrate Indicates the relative strength of the target country's currency with respect 
to the U.S. dollar. The strength of the home currency versus the foreign 
currency can impact the cost of the cross-border M&A transaction (see for 
example Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000)). Similar to Harris and 
Ravenscraft (1991), we calculate the strength of the target currency with 
respect to the U.S. currency by subtracting the average exchange rate (in 
terms of U.S. dollar) in the announcement year from the average exchange 
rate (in terms of U.S. dollar) during the sample period and dividing the 
result by the average exchange rate during the sample period. Positive 
results indicate that the foreign currency was stronger during the 
announcement year than during the average sample period, while negative 
results point to the opposite. The exchange rate data are obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Bank. 
Dev Takes the value of 1.0 if the target country is a developing country, and 
zero otherwise. This information is obtained from the World Bank.
Bprofit Indicates the bidder firm's profitability in the year of the cross-border 
M&A, calculated by the bidder's annual income divided by its total assets. 
This information is obtained from Compustat.
Related Takes the value of 1.0 if the target and bidder firms operate in related 
industries, measured by the 4-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise. This 
information is obtained from Compustat. Previous literature has argued 
that acquisitions within the same industry are, on average, more successful 
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than acquisitions between different industries (see Bhagat, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1990); and Markides and Ittner (1994)). 
Prior1 Takes the value of 1.0 if the bidder has any other international 
involvement at the time of the cross-border M&A announcement, and zero 
otherwise. This information is obtained from the Directory of Corporate 
Affiliations.
Prior2 Takes the value of 1.0 if the bidder already has previous involvement in 
the target country at the time of the cross-border M&A announcement, and 
zero otherwise. This information is obtained from the Directory of 
Corporate Affiliations.
Prior3 Takes the value of 1.0 if the bidder has previous involvement in the 
geographic region where the target country is located at the time of the 
cross-border M&A announcement, and zero otherwise. This information is 
obtained from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. 
1.5. Results
1.5.1. Short-Run Results
Table 1.5 shows univariate results for the 2-day and 3-day mean and median 
cumulative abnormal returns for the bidder firms in our sample. The results for the full 
sample indicate positive mean (0.5 percent) and median (0.3 percent) 2-day abnormal 
returns, similar to observations by Pettway et al. (1993) and Doukas and Travlos (1988). 
However, the significance level is only marginal at 10 percent, and the 3-day abnormal 
mean and median returns are not significant, which is in accordance with the Bruner’s 
(2004) findings of mostly non-significant cumulative abnormal returns for U.S. bidder 
firms in cross-border M&As. When we examine the cumulative abnormal returns in more 
detail, we find statistical significance for several subgroups. Specifically, the abnormal 
returns are significantly positive with 0.8 percent (2-day CAR) and 0.9 percent (3-day 
CAR) when the acquisition is financed using cash, which supports previous findings by 
Biswas et al. (1999). We further find significantly positive abnormal returns of 1.1 
percent (2-day CAR) and 0.9 percent (3-day CAR) when the firm had no previous 
announcement during the sample period, and positive abnormal returns of 0.9 percent (2-
day CAR) and 0.5 percent (3-day CAR) when the acquisition is between firms that do not 
operate in the same industry. The median abnormal 2-day return shows some weak 
positive significance when the firm has below average advertisement expenses, the target 
firm is in a developed country, and the cultural distance is low. Similar to Kiymaz and 
Mukherjee (2000), we find significantly positive abnormal returns of 2.6 percent (2-day 
CAR) and 2.8 percent (3-day CAR) when the target firm is located in Germany. We also 
find some positive significance for abnormal returns when the target firm is located in 
Australia.  
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Table 1.6 shows the event study regression results. In Model 1, we regress the 3-day 
mean cumulative abnormal return on the bidder firm’s level of R&D, advertisement 
expenses, cultural distance between the U.S. and the target firm’s country, as well as on 
interaction terms between the individual intangible assets and cultural distance. 
Following Aiken and West (1991), we use centered values for both intangible assets and 
cultural distance variables in the model by subtracting the sample mean from the raw 
score of these variables, which makes the interpretation of the regression coefficients 
more realistic. Without the centering approach we must interpret the coefficients of RD 
and AdE as the impact on the dependent variable conditional on zero cultural distance.
Centering allows us to interpret the coefficient of RD and AdE assuming average cultural 
distance.3 Similarly, we can interpret cultural distance assuming average levels of 
intangibles rather than the assumption that expenses for intangibles are equal to zero. 
We find that R&D expenses, cultural distance, and the interaction term between these 
two variables all create significantly negative wealth effects in the short-run. Our result
thereby expands the findings of Morck and Young (1992), who report positive abnormal 
announcement returns for bidder firms that possess high levels of intangible assets, but 
who do not account for differences in national culture. In particular, we show that 
internalizing intangibles is association with wealth destruction in the presence of average 
and, more severely, high cultural distance. This result provides support in favor of 
Hypothesis 1b. Investors are likely to be concerned about the bidder firm’s ability to 
successfully integrate target firms when cultural norms and values differ greatly (Kogut 
and Singh (1988), and Datta and Puia (1995)). Specifically, the results suggest that the 
investors’ concerns outweigh any potential benefits from internalization of technological 
know-how. 
The second intangible asset, marketing expertise, does not contribute to explaining 
the cumulative abnormal announcement return. This finding is consistent with Morck and 
Yeung (1992), who conclude that technological know-how might be more easily 
transferred overseas than marketing expertise. Our results suggest that on average the 
market does not consider the marketing expertise for our sample firms upon a cross-
border M&A announcement. We verify this finding in Model 2, where we regress the 
cumulative abnormal return on additional explanatory variables as well as on industry 
dummies and year dummies. The interaction term between R&D and cultural distance 
remains negative and significant at the 1 percent level, while the impact of advertisement 
expenses on the announcement return remains insignificant. Model 2 further suggests that 
larger bidder firms experience negative announcement effects, which is consistent with 
previous findings (Morck and Yeung (1992)). Lastly, Model 2 indicates that acquisitions 
that are financed using cash rather than stock payment or a mix of payment methods are 
significantly positively associated with announcement returns. This finding supports our 
univariate results of significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns for the subsample 
of cash transactions. 
1.5.2. Robustness Checks for the Short-Run
All our regression models use robust standard errors. To ensure consistency in the 
results, we also regress the 2-day cumulative abnormal returns on the explanatory 
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variables. The results widely mirror those of the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns. 
Table 1.7 shows additional robustness tests. In Model 1 we control for firms that had 
previous announcements in our sample. We include this test because the univariate 
results showed significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns for bidder firms that 
have no previous announcements in the sample. As expected, the control variable is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This implies that subsequent 
announcements are associated with negative wealth effects relative to firms that have 
their first announcement. Including this control variable does not alter our findings for the 
interaction term between R&D and cultural distance. In Model 2 we control for 
differences between income levels in the U.S. and the target country. Typically the U.S. 
has the higher income levels, measured by gross national income.4 We include this 
variable because of the significantly positive correlation of 0.57 between cultural distance 
and difference in gross national income. Countries with high cultural distance also tend to 
have low gross national income, which happens mostly in developing countries. Model 2 
shows that both cultural distance and the interaction between cultural distance and R&D 
remain negative and the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
In Model 3 and Model 4 we expand on the previous models by controlling for 
investors’ legal rights as introduced by LaPorta, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1997, 1998) [LLSV]. If the Hofstede index captures aspects of national culture 
and is not subsumed in LLSV’s control variables, then our regression findings from the 
previous table should continue to hold. We also control for bidder firms’ previous 
experience in the target country and its geographic area.
Model 3 include the legal rights variable Civil to indicate that the bidder firm acquires 
a target from a civil law country. LLSV have shown that shareholder protection is lower 
in countries with civil law than in countries with common law. Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
show that takeover markets are more active in countries with better investor protection.  
Less competition in civil law countries can reduce the acquisition cost for foreign targets 
and therefore increase the potential profit to the bidder firm. Our findings are robust to 
the inclusion of the target country’s legal system. Model 4 includes Corruption, which is 
another LLSV measure for shareholder protection. Again, we find that our results remain 
unchanged.
We also control for additional variables that are not included in the table. In 
particular, we look at regressions controlling individually for previous bidder firm 
experience internationally (Prior1), the target country specifically (Prior2), and the 
geographic area of the target country (Prior3). Our main results remain consistent. We 
further control for tech-bubble period (see Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004)), expansion 
versus recession periods,5 and relative size (see Benou et al. (2007)), and the main results 
do not change. Lastly, we run all models excluding countries and years for which the 
univariate analysis showed significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns. We find 
that the regression results continue to hold. These robustness checks lend further support 
to Hypothesis 1b, suggesting that investors are concerned about the bidder firm’s ability 
to internalize its intangible assets when the target country’s culture differs significantly 
from the U.S. 
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1.5.3. Long-Run Results
1.5.3.1. Calendar-Time Portfolio Approach
Long-run analysis of our sample firms provides additional support for the 
internalization hypothesis. Table 1.8 shows the results of abnormal stock performance in 
Years 1, 3, and 5 after the cross-border acquisition announcement. Consistent with Conn 
et al. (2005), we find that firms with high levels of technological know-how perform 
better than firms with low levels of technological know-how, where technological know 
how is measured by the expenses in R&D relative to sales in the year prior to the 
announcement. Specifically, we find normal long-run performance for the entire sample 
(Panel A) as well as for the subsample of firms with high levels of R&D (Panel B). 
However, firms with below industry-average levels of R&D experience significantly 
negative long-run abnormal returns (Panel C). We further examine the abnormal long-run 
performance for sample firms with high (Panel D) and low (Panel E) levels of 
advertisement expenses. In general, the abnormal returns for both subgroups are not 
significantly different from zero.6 These results, especially when considering R&D, 
provide support for Hypothesis 3 since U.S. bidder firms with high levels of intangible 
assets do not experience negative long-run stock performance. When we sort the sample 
by cultural distance, we find that firms that acquire targets in countries with great cultural 
differences experience significantly negative abnormal returns (Panel F), while firms that 
focus on targets from similar cultural backgrounds experience no abnormal long-run 
returns (Panel G). 
Next we examine the joint effects of intangibles intensity and cultural distance in the 
long-run performance analysis. Firms with low levels of R&D only experience 
significantly negative abnormal returns in Year 1 when cultural distance is low (Panel H), 
but they experience significantly negative abnormal returns in Years 3 and 5 after the 
initial announcement when cultural distance is great (Panel I). Consistent with our earlier 
findings, these results suggest that acquirers with low internalization potential have 
difficulty creating value in takeovers in culturally distant countries.  Firms with high 
levels of R&D experience normal long-run returns, no matter whether cultural distance is 
low (Panel J) or high (Panel K). 
We also examine the interaction between levels of advertisement expenses with levels 
of cultural distance. We find that bidder firms with below industry-average levels of 
advertisement expenses have no abnormal returns if they acquire in culturally similar 
target countries (Panel L), but there is some evidence for negative abnormal returns in 
Years 3 and 5 if the cultural distance is high (Panel M). The results for bidder firms with 
high levels of advertisement expenses are similar. There is no abnormal long-run return if 
these firms acquire in countries with low cultural differences (Panel N), but firms that 
acquire in countries with great cultural distance experience negative abnormal returns in 
years 1, 3, and 5 after the announcement (Panel O). To summarize the results in Table 
1.8, we find that firms with high levels of R&D experience normal returns in the first 5 
years after the cross-border acquisition announcement, regardless of the level of cultural 
distance. However, bidders with low levels of R&D who acquire targets in culturally 
distant countries experience significant negative long-run monthly returns in the 5 years 
following the merger.  The results also suggest that firms with high levels of 
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advertisement expenses are more sensitive to cultural distance.  Overall, these findings 
provide support for the internalization theory and the value of intangibles in the form of 
R&D in cross-border mergers.
1.5.3.2. Operating Performance
Table 1.9 shows the results of the long-run study using abnormal operating 
performance as the dependent variable. Similar to Fee and Thomas (2004), we divide 
cash flows by sales to obtain a company’s operating performance, and we subtract from it 
the average industry operating performance. We compute these values for each of the 
first three years following the cross-border M&A announcements. As before, we center 
the variables for R&D, advertisement expenses, and cultural distance by subtracting the 
sample mean from every observation to allow for easier interpretation of the regression 
results that include interaction terms. In Model 1 we find that level of R&D, given 
average cultural distance, impacts operating performance negatively in all years with 
significance at the 1 percent level.  This relationship persists therefore in the short-run as 
well as in the long-run. The finding suggests that internalization of technological know-
how is either challenging or more expensive than other forms of conducting international 
business if there is an average cultural distance between the bidder and the target 
countries. In line with the short-run results, cultural distance and the interaction term 
between cultural distance and R&D impact the operating performance negatively in the 
first year after the announcement. However, the results are not statistically significant. 
Even more interesting are the results for Years 2 and 3 after the announcement, where 
these coefficients change signs. Firms with average levels of R&D and advertisement 
expenses eventually begin to benefit from greater cultural distance, which is in line with 
findings by Morosini et al. (1998). The results are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
and 1 percent level in Years 2 and 3, respectively. The positive sign of the interaction 
term between cultural distance and R&D suggests that firms with high levels of R&D 
also begin to benefit from internalizing their intangible assets in countries with different 
norms and values. The coefficients are highly significant at the 1 percent level both in 
Year 2 and Year 3. Similar to the short-run analysis, advertisement expense does not have 
much impact on the abnormal operating performance, although the coefficient also 
changes its sign from negative in Year 1 to positive in Year 2 and Year 3. The coefficient 
is marginally significant at the 10 percent level in year 2. This finding provides some 
evidence that it requires strong marketing expertise to adapt to large cultural differences 
(Hypothesis 5b).
In Model 2 we find that our results generally remain significant even after controlling 
for the most common additional explanatory variables. Based on these results we find
evidence supportive of Hypothesis 4a, suggesting that it is beneficial in the long-run to 
internalize technological know-how between culturally different countries. The findings 
on internalizing marketing expertise provide some support for Hypothesis 4a, suggesting 
that it requires strong marketing expertise to successfully implement this intangible asset 
in countries with different national cultures. 
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1.5.4. Robustness Checks for the Long-Run
Similar to the short-run regressions, we use robust standard errors with the long-run 
regression as well. Table 1.10 shows additional robustness tests that were also conducted 
for the short-run. In Model 1 we control for firms that had previous announcements in our 
sample. The sign associated with the control variable is now positive and mostly 
insignificant. All other previously reported long-run results still hold. In Model 2 we 
control for differences between income levels in the U.S. and the target country. By 
including this control variable we want to ensure that our findings are truly impacted by 
culture and not by income levels. Model 2 shows that gross national product does not 
alter our previous long-run results. We perform the same additional robustness checks in 
the long-run as we did in the short-run (i.e., control for previous bidder experience 
overseas, in the target country, and in the geographic area of the target country, as well as 
for tech-bubble, recession verses expansion, and relative size), and our main results 
remain consistent. Again, we run all models excluding countries and years for which the 
univariate analysis showed significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns, and the 
regression results do not change. These robustness checks lend further support to 
Hypotheses 4a and 5a, suggesting that firms benefit from internalizing intangible assets 
among countries with cultural differences.
1.6. Conclusions
In this study, we examine the impact of national culture on internalization benefits in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Our sample consists of 468 U.S. bidder companies 
that acquired non-U.S. target firms between 1987 and 2004. Our findings differ for the 
short-run and the long-run. At the announcement, the results suggest that investors are 
concerned about U.S. bidders incorporating target firms from countries with large 
cultural differences. We further suggest that the perceived difficulties outweigh any 
potential benefits from internalizing technological know-how in the foreign market. The 
bidder firm’s marketing expertise does not receive much attention during the 
announcement which is consistent with previous research (Morck and Yeung (1992)). 
In the first year after the announcement, the operating performance simulates much of 
the short-run results, however without statistical significance. A noticeable change occurs 
in Year 2 and Year 3 after the announcement. Firms with large levels of intangible assets, 
both technological know-how and, to a lesser extent, marketing expertise, begin to 
significantly benefit from internalization in countries with great cultural differences. Our 
results thereby add to the literature by providing long-run support for the internalization 
theory and by highlighting the importance of cultural differences when examining 
internalization benefits. A rational explanation for our findings is that it might be less 
costly for firms to expand intangible assets into a foreign market through acquisition 
rather than through contracting as cultural differences between bidder and target country 
increase. We find additional long-run support for the internalization theory when looking 
at the abnormal stock performance one, three, and five years after the cross-border 
acquisition announcement.
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Investors and managers alike can profit from the empirical evidence that possessing 
high levels of intangibles alone does not guarantee positive internalization benefits. More 
specifically, our results suggest that long-term internalization benefits are larger when 
cultural distance is high. 
1.7. Future Research
Future research may extend the current findings by expanding the bidder firm sample 
to bidder firms from non-US countries. The increased bidder sample will provide a more 
generalizable conclusion of the results. It is also interesting to compare the combined 
operating performance of bidder and target firms prior to and after the cross-border 
M&A.   Furthermore, examining the factors that influence the likelihood of making an 
acquisition in a culturally similar versus culturally different country would provide 
additional insights on the types of bidders that make different types of cross-border 
acquisitions.  Lastly, it would be useful to include bidder firm CEOs’ nationality and 
education location in the regression analyses to control for firms that possess better 
insights into the foreign culture of the target country. It seems reasonable to assume that 
foreign CEOs such as Roberto Goizueta (The Coca Cola Company, 1980 through 1998, 
originally form Cuba) and Eckhard Pfeiffer (Compaq, 1991 through 1998, originally 
from Germany) can lend more guidance to the successful integration of a target country 
in a culture similar to their home culture.
1.8. Notes
1 Hofstede’s IBM-based scores from around 1970 have been extensively validated 
against more recent survey data (see Hofstede, 2001, Appendix 6). It is important to 
realize that the scores indicate the relative position of countries on the values scales; 
their absolute value has no meaning. Hofstede firmly believes that differences 
between national cultures are stable through time. Specifically, he states that 
"[i]nfluences like those of new technologies tend to affect all countries without 
necessarily changing their relative position or ranking; if their cultures change, they 
change in formation." (Hofstede, 2001, p. 36). Estimated values of scores for 
countries not in the original research (e.g. Russia) are based on replications and 
extensions of the IBM study (Hofstede, 2001, p. 502).
2 Kogut and Singh (1988) point out that although this particular measure creates 
weights related to the index variance, there should be no theoretical correlation 
between any possible measurement errors and other independent variables.
3 Kromrey and Foster-Johnson (1998) point out that mean centering does not alter the 
general interpretation of the regression results.
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4 We loose about 30 observations due to data unavailability and the exclusion of 14 
observations where the target country has the higher gross national income level. This 
is true for Switzerland, Norway, and Japan. Alternatively, we use all observations for 
the difference in gross national income by including absolute values to avoid netting 
out of positive and negative values. This method does not alter the results.
5 Recessions occurred from July 1990 through March 1991, and from March 2001 
through November 2001. All other time periods were expansions.
6 Only the 1 year abnormal return is negative, significant at the 10 percent level, for 
equally-weighted portfolios when the level of advertisement expenses is high.
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Chapter 2
Implications of Early Versus Late-Mover Status for Bidders and Their Rivals in 
Cross-Border Acquisitions
2.1. Introduction
According to the first-mover advantage hypothesis, firms that possess information 
advantages to pioneer new investment avenues can earn significant positive abnormal 
returns if they are among the first to exploit these new avenues. In particular, firms that 
own rare, valuable, and difficult-to-imitate resources can exploit supernormal profits 
(Oliver (1997)), especially if these firms establish competitive advantages before their 
peers do (Lieberman and Montgomery (1988)). If competitive strategies are present, then 
early-movers typically perform better than later followers (Lee, Smith, Grimm and 
Schomburg (2000)). Recent empirical evidence suggests that this early-mover advantage 
can also explain the superior performance of strategic target acquisitions within the same 
industry at the beginning of a merger wave compared to later target acquisitions, and 
compared to acquisitions outside a merger wave (Carow, Heron and Saxton (2004)). 
While, on average, bidder firms do not earn significant positive abnormal returns upon 
the announcement of a domestic merger (Jensen and Ruback (1983); and Mulherin and 
Boone (2000)), early-movers in strategic acquisitions (Carow et al. (2004)) and 
unexpected merger announcements (Song and Walkling (2005)) can earn significant 
positive abnormal returns for bidder firms’ shareholders. Early movers enjoy a wider 
spectrum of potentially profitable target acquisitions from which to choose, whereas later 
acquirers generally face greater competition over fewer targets (Carow et al. (2004)), 
which consequently increases the acquisition premia and makes the acquisitions less 
profitable or potentially even unprofitable. 
Prior studies examining acquirer returns in foreign acquisitions have generally found 
that bidder firm shareholders lose in these takeovers. For example, Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) compare domestic and foreign acquisitions from 1985 through 
1995 and find that event period abnormal returns for acquirers of foreign targets are 
significantly lower than those for acquirers of domestic targets. Similarly, Eckbo and 
Thorburn (2000) also find evidence of lower event period abnormal returns for foreign 
acquirers of Canadian targets than for domestic acquirers. Furthermore, André, Kooli, 
and L’Her (2004) find that Canadian bidders perform poorly in cross-border deals in the 
long-run, and Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005) find similar poor performance for 
UK acquirers in foreign takeovers of public targets.  
In addition to prior studies finding that the average bidder does not fare well in cross-
border mergers, the finance literature also documents that certain types of bidders may 
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experience positive bidder firm announcement returns for cross-border acquisitions (e.g., 
Doukos and Travlos (1988); Morck and Yeung (1992); Markides and Ittner (1994); and 
Chakrabarti, Jayaraman and Mukherjee (2008)). For example, acquirer gains appear to be 
positively related to advertising intensity, target size, oligopolistic industries, U.S. dollar 
strength, and previous international experience (Markides and Ittner (1994)). In addition, 
Morck and Yeung (1992) find a positive relation between wealth increase upon a cross-
border M&A and the bidder firm’s level of intangible assets. The possible wealth effect 
to bidder firm shareholders can, in part, be explained by operational, strategic, and 
financial diversification benefits. Further, the bidder firm’s return depends on whether the 
target firm operates in a related industry, the concentration level of the bidder firm’s 
industry, the bidder firm’s relative advertisement spending, the bidder firm’s international 
experience, and the bidder firm’s profitability at the time of the M&A (Markides and 
Ittner (1994)). Although previous studies have identified a number of factors that 
influence the bidder firm shareholders’ wealth gains in cross-border mergers, the strategic 
implications of early-mover acquisitions have not been specifically explored.
The purpose of this study is to explain abnormal bidder firms’ returns in cross-border 
M&As by comparing the first-mover hypothesis to the late-mover hypothesis. While 
Carow et al. (2004) successfully establish pioneering advantages for early-movers in 
domestic acquisitions, we are not aware of any study to date that looks at timing 
advantages in cross-border acquisitions. In addition to studying the differences in wealth 
gains of early-movers compared to late-movers, this study also focuses on the reaction of 
bidder rival firms to the merger announcement as a further test of the first-mover 
hypothesis. Song and Walkling (2005) examine rival firms’ reactions with a sample 
consisting primarily of domestic target firms and only a minority percentage of foreign 
target firms. Their study neither highlights the benefits of acquiring foreign targets nor 
addresses country differences. 
The result of this research reveals the market’s perception about internalization 
benefits at various stages of a merger wave. Specifically, this research attempts to 
indicate at which stage of a merger wave it is advantageous to internalize intangibles and 
if differences in national culture impact announcement returns. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the early-
mover and intra-industry literature, Section 3 introduces the proposed hypotheses, 
Section 4 discusses the research methodology and the data that are utilized to test the 
proposed hypotheses, Section 5 presents the empirical results, Section 6 states the study’s 
conclusions, and Section 7 ends with future research opportunities. 
2.2. Literature Review
2.2.1. First-Movers and Late-Entrants
First-mover advantages arise when a firm materializes positive net present value 
gains by entering a new market before anybody else does. Research shows that 
“technological leadership,” “preemption of scarce assets,” and “switching costs” are 
likely sources that create first-mover advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery (1988)). 
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Firms can achieve “technological leadership” by investing in research and development 
(R&D) that result in patented know-how or organizational innovations. If industry 
competitors cannot afford to allocate similar funds to the development of technology, 
they might be blocked from entering the new market. Such barriers to entry increase the 
time period where the first-mover is in the lead before the first rivals begin to follow 
(Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson (1992)). “Preemption of assets” refers to taking 
possession of available assets, such as valuable target firms, before anybody else does. 
When a U.S. firm acquires a non-U.S. target, for example, the first-mover enjoys the 
widest variety of targets to choose from and can select the most valuable target firm 
(Carow et al. (2004)). On the other hand, later entrants are limited to the remaining 
targets, which might not provide any positive net present value projects. Early-movers 
can also take advantage of other assets, such as the local work force, suppliers, and 
distributors (Lieberman and Montgomery (1988)). Finally, late-entrants might face 
“switching costs,” which are the costs associated with attracting customers away from 
early-movers that have already established relationships. This cost barrier to late-entrants 
further benefits the early-movers by allowing them initially to enjoy profits that they do 
not have to share with competitors. If late-entrants are unable to divert a significant 
number of customers form the early-mover, switching costs are a lasting benefit to early-
movers. For example, Makadok (1998) examines the money market mutual fund industry 
where products can be easily imitated, yet early-movers were able to maintain a leading 
status because they had already secured access to their customer base. 
Kerin et al. (1992) and Carow et al. (2004) point out that being a first-mover alone, 
on average, does not provide any abnormal returns. Only “strategic pioneers,” which are 
firms that possess proprietary information, earn abnormal returns. In addition, first-
movers are more likely to experience superior stock performance if they acquire targets 
in related industries, pay for the transaction in cash, and purchase during expansionary 
time periods in the targeted industry (Carow et al. (2004)). 
Although firms typically benefit from being first- and early-movers, there are 
exceptions where it is desirable to wait and enter the new market at a later point. For 
example, late-entrants might be able to save innovation costs by free-riding on first- and 
early-movers’ investments in areas such as R&D, buyer education, and infrastructure 
(Lieberman and Montgomery (1988)), and by imitating products or processes rather than 
originally designing them (Shankar, Carpenter, and Krishnamurti (1998)). For example, 
Texas Instruments gained market dominance in the hand-held calculator industry by 
producing at a lower cost than the pioneers Bowmar Brain and Canon Pocketronic 
(Schnaars (1986)). Therefore, if firms can save expensive innovation expenses and easily 
enter new markets via product imitation, the pioneers might not have enough lead time to 
fully recoup their initial expenses and to secure a loyal customer, employee, and supplier 
source. The reduction of the pioneers’ benefits in this case reduces the incentive of 
becoming a first-mover (Lieberman and Montgomery (1988)). 
Entering the market at a later time might also provide additional benefits of decreased 
market and technology uncertainty (Lieberman and Montgomery (1988)), possibilities to 
enhance existing processes and products to meet changing customer needs (Scherer 
(1980)), and to innovate by utilizing resources and expertise more efficiently to surpass 
early-movers (Lieberman and Montgomery (1998); and Shankar et al. (1998)). For 
28
example, Matsushita gained a leading position in the product market as a later entrant by 
designing a superior videocassette recorder at lower cost than the pioneer Sony did 
(Schnaars (1986)).
2.2.2. Intra-Industry Effects
Cross-border M&A announcements might not only impact the announcing firm’s 
stock price, but also the industry rival firms’ stock prices. Previous research has found 
numerous examples of contagion and competitive effects in rival firms when the 
announcement seemed to convey more than only firm-specific information. For example, 
Lang and Stulz (1992) examine the impact of bankruptcy announcements and find both a 
contagion and a competitive effect in rival firms. The contagion effect can stem from 
heightened customer and supplier concerns about the future health of all firms within the 
industry that announced the bankruptcy and expected lower industry-specific cash flows 
in the future. Highly leveraged firms seem to be effected more severely by this contagion 
effect. On the other hand, highly concentrated industries – that is, industries with a low 
number of competitors - with low leverage enjoy positive value effects. 
Intra-industry research of takeovers shows that rival firms of targets earn positive 
announcement returns regardless of the M&A’s final success, and regardless of whether 
the M&A is horizontal or vertical (Song and Walking (2000)). Furthermore, other 
research reports positive valuation effects for rival firms upon horizontal merger 
announcements in the mining and manufacturing industry (Eckbo, 1983). Shahrur (2005) 
utilizes firms from the SDC database during 1987 and 1999 and confirms this result. 
When focusing on merger announcements in the insurance industry, studies show that 
industry rival firms react positively to merger announcements. The magnitude of the 
intra-industry effect depends on the firm characteristics such as location, type and size 
(Akhigbe and Madura (2001)). Specifically, rival firms earn significantly positive 
announcement returns when they are located in the same regional area as the bidder firm, 
and if the target firm carries only one type of insurance, especially if it is a life insurance 
(Akhigbe and Madura (2001)). Lastly, rival firms earn greater positive announcement 
returns if their size is similar to the size of the bidder firm (Akhigbe and Madura (2001)). 
Although there is a significant amount of research available on intra-industry effects 
of different announcements in general and mergers and acquisitions in particular, Song 
and Walking (2005) note that the research on bidder firms’ rivals is scarce. They argue 
that these rival firms’ responses are hard to measure because bidder firms’ returns are 
typically very small. While this is true for domestic and cross-border mergers in general, 
certain cross-border M&As promise greater bidder firm announcement effects. For 
example, bidder firms that possess intangible assets earn positive announcement returns 
(Morck and Yeung (1991, 1992)). In addition, the domestic first-mover literature 
suggests that announcements by strategic pioneers are value increasing (Carow et al. 
(2004)). If bidder firms observe significant announcement returns, these returns could 
send a signal and impact all firms within the industry or firms that will subsequently 
become bidder firms themselves (Song and Walking (2005)). In fact, Song and Walkling 
(2005) find that rival firms’ stock prices adjust upon M&A announcements. Moreover, 
rival firms that are expected to become subsequent bidder firms adjust their wealth in 
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proportion to the level of the bidder firm’s announcement return. These returns are 
significantly different from rival firms that are not expected to become subsequent bidder 
firms. This result suggests that bidder firms’ rivals display a contagion effect. While the 
authors include international acquisitions in their sample, their study focuses neither on 
the benefits of acquiring foreign targets nor on country differences. Our study fills this 
existing gap by addressing the effects of cross-border acquisitions on bidder rivals. We 
specifically examine the importance of acquisition timing, as an early versus late-mover, 
and the role of cultural differences in affecting the shareholder wealth gains for the bidder 
firms and their rivals within the same industry.
2.3. Hypotheses
If the first-mover advantage hypothesis can be utilized to explain observed abnormal 
bidder returns upon the announcement of foreign-target acquisitions, we should expect 
that early acquisitions create more profitable bidder firm returns than subsequent 
acquisitions. However, being a first-mover alone might not provide abnormal returns 
(Kerin et al. (1992); and Carow et al. (2004)). To earn abnormal announcement returns, 
the authors suggest that the bidder firms need to be classified as “strategic pioneers,” 
which are first-movers that possess proprietary information. In addition, acquisitions 
between firms in related industries, expanding bidder industries, and cash payments 
qualify as a strategic bidder decision, where firms acquire early because they have 
superior information compared to firms that acquire early without any competitive 
advantage (Servaes (1991); Maquieira, Megginson and Nail (1998); and Carow et al. 
(2004)). Furthermore, Song and Walkling (2005) note that first-mover advantages are 
more likely to be observed in horizontal and vertical mergers rather than in unrelated 
mergers. Following these arguments, strategic pioneers should earn positive abnormal 
announcement returns in horizontal cross-border M&As. If the first-mover advantage 
hypothesis holds in cross-border acquisitions, we expect that strategic pioneers earn 
significantly higher announcement returns than late-movers and early-movers without 
comparative advantages.
Hypothesis 1a: Strategic pioneers will realize more favorable announcement 
returns than late-movers if early-mover advantages exist.
On the other hand, we might observe late-mover advantages (Shankar et al. (1998)) if 
firms can benefit from early-movers’ groundwork and their potential mistakes when 
entering the foreign market (Luo (1998)). Specifically, early-movers have to invest in 
educating the foreign government and customers, and in establishing necessary 
infrastructure. If later entrants can save much of these cost disadvantages (Dewenter 
(1995)) and either inexpensively imitate early-movers’ technology (Shankar et al. (1998)) 
or use their own R&D to surpass existing technology (Lieberman and Montgomery 
(1998) and Shankar et al. (1998)), we expect that later acquisitions are more value-
enhancing than early acquisitions. If early-movers cannot recover their initial expenses 
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and/or later entrants obtain sufficient market share, early acquisitions may be value 
destroying.  
Hypothesis 1b: Late-movers will realize more favorable announcement returns 
than strategic pioneers if late-mover advantages exist.
In addition to bidder returns in general, the aspect of cultural distance has received 
increased attention in recent years with respect to explaining abnormal returns in cross-
border M&As (Stulz and Wiliamson (2003); Chakrabarti et al. (2008)). The psychologist 
Geert Hofstede was among the first to study differences in national cultures when 
working for IBM and conducting surveys with more than 100,000 IBM employees from 
subsidiaries in more than 50 countries between 1967 and 1973. From these surveys, 
Hofstede developed cultural dimensions that allow us to measure how similar different 
national cultures are (Hofstede (1980)).1 Studies that utilize Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions find mixed evidence pertaining to the impact of cultural distance on the 
performance of cross-border acquisitions. On the one hand, research suggests that a 
greater cultural difference between two countries increases acquisitions costs and creates 
negative wealth effects for the bidder firm’s shareholders (Datta and Puia (1995)). On the 
other hand, studies show positive relations between bidder firms’ wealth effects and 
cultural distance, possibly due to the acquisition of new routines and repertoires 
(Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998)) and less integration problems if the target remains 
autonomous (Chakrabari et al. (2005)). 
To develop some prediction for the effect of cultural distance on early-movers’ 
announcement returns, we focus on early-movers with technological leadership. 
Technological leadership is mentioned as a possible source of the proprietary information 
that a strategic pioneer possesses, and it is measured by the level of research and 
development (R&D) associated with the bidder firm (Lieberman and Montgomery 
(1988)). Following the logic of Morck and Yeung’s (1991, 1992) internalization theory, 
pioneers with high levels of technological know-how might wish to internalize markets 
for their intangible assets by acquiring a foreign target firm. The impact of culture on the 
internalization benefit for pioneers with technological know-how can be twofold. We 
might observe a positive relationship between cultural distance and the pioneer’s 
announcement return if it is beneficial to internalize the intangible assets between 
culturally different countries. This is plausible if contracting (e.g. licensing and 
franchising) is less expensive in culturally similar climates. If this is true, an increasing 
difference between two countries’ cultures is likely to make contracting more costly and 
the purchase of a foreign company more attractive. The pioneer’s announcement return 
could therefore increase with cultural distance.
Hypothesis 2a: Cultural distance between target and bidder countries should 
positively affect the announcement return for strategic pioneers with high levels 
of technological know-how due to the benefits of internalization of intangible 
assets.
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On the other hand, if the early-mover owns technological know-how that it wishes to 
internalize among more than only the domestic market, it is reasonable to assume that 
pioneer and target firm have to work together closely and integrate the target firm 
successfully. Because countries cultivate organization styles and administration routines 
based on their national culture (Kogut and Singh (1988)), integration would be much 
easier to accomplish if bidder firm and target firm share similar norms and values. 
Following this rationale, Datta and Puia (1995) imply that less cultural distance eases 
post-acquisition integration of the target firm. Thus, we could also observe a negative 
relation between cultural distance and pioneer announcement effects.
Hypothesis 2b: Cultural distance between target and bidder countries should 
negatively affect the announcement return for early-movers with high levels of 
technological know-how if the cost of post-acquisition integration of the target 
firm outweighs internalization benefits.
In addition to examining the bidder firm announcement returns, we also study the 
bidder firms’ rivals and their stock price responses to the cross-border M&A 
announcements. Rival firms might experience positive announcement effects during 
early-mover acquisitions for two reasons. If the market believes that strategic cross-
border acquisitions are value-enhancing for early-movers, such cross-border 
announcements could signal information about the value of industry rivals (see Song and 
Walkling (2005)).  According to the first-mover hypothesis, strategic early-movers 
should earn higher abnormal announcement returns than firms that subsequently follow 
and imitate the move at a later time. If the initial announcement of a strategic acquisition 
signals good news to the market and if there are still other positive net present value 
(NPV) targets available in the new market place, we expect that firms with similar 
characteristics as the initial bidder experience positive abnormal returns at the initial 
bidder firm’s announcement. However, as time passes and fewer profitable target firms 
remain available, we expect to observe non-positive rival responses to later bidder 
announcements.
Hypothesis 3a: Rival firms earn positive CARs during early-mover 
announcements if early-mover advantages exist and if it is beneficial to become a 
subsequent early bidder. 
Hypothesis 3b: Rival firms earn non-positive CARs during follower and late-
mover announcements if early-mover advantages exist and if it is beneficial to 
become a subsequent early bidder. 
A second opportunity for rivals to experience positive returns at early-movers’ 
acquisition announcements is possible if the perceived cost disadvantages to early-
movers outweigh internalization benefits initially. Once the foreign market has become 
accustomed to U.S. firms and if barriers to entry are not too high, rivals of early-mover 
bidders are likely to materialize value-creating opportunities. However, as more 
competition enters the foreign market successfully, barriers of entry are likely to rise for 
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subsequent bidders because lucrative target firms as well as suppliers and customers 
become scarce. Once acquisitions in the target country are no longer value-enhancing, we 
expect that rivals experience non-positive CARs during the announcement of the bidder 
firm. 
Hypothesis 3c: Rival firms earn positive CARs during early-mover 
announcements if late-mover advantages exist and if it is beneficial to wait and 
learn from early-movers’ mistakes. 
Hypothesis 3d: Rival firms earn non-positive CARs during follower and late-
mover announcements if late-mover advantages exist and followers and late-
movers are able to establish barriers to entry.
Although we might observe positive rival firm reactions during early-mover 
announcements under the above stated conditions, it is also possible to observe negative 
rival responses during early-mover announcements. For example, if strategic cross-border 
acquisitions are value-enhancing for early-movers and barriers to entry can be established 
immediately, rivals should earn non-positive CARs at the early-movers’ acquisition 
announcement.
Hypothesis 3e: Rival firms earn non-positive CARs during early-mover 
announcements if early-mover advantages exist and if early-movers can establish 
barriers to entry immediately.
We might further find non-positive rival reactions to early-mover announcements if 
early market entry causes value destruction in cross-border M&As, and if investors are 
concerned that rivals are likely to follow the early-mover while cost-disadvantages still 
outweigh any internalization benefits.
Hypothesis 3f: Rival firms earn non-positive CARs during early-mover 
announcements if late-mover advantages exist and if investors anticipate rivals of 
early-movers to engage in equally value-destroying activities as the early-movers 
themselves.
   
2.4. Data and Methodology
2.4.1. Sample Description 
We used the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database to 
identify an initial sample of 7,499 completed horizontal cross-border takeovers 
announced by publicly traded U.S. bidder firms from 1987 through 2004. The takeovers 
reflect majority stake acquisitions or 100 percent purchases of the target firm. Also, 
bidder and target firms share the same 4-digit primary Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code. To remain in the sample, the announcement must meet the following criteria:
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1. The announcement date could be determined using the Wall Street Journal or 
the Lexis-Nexis News Wire file.
2. Appropriate stock and firm information is available on the Center for 
Research and Security Prices (CRSP) files and the Compustat database.
3. Following André, Kooli and L’Her (2004) and others, the transaction value 
must be at least US$ 10 million. 
4. Similar to Fee and Thomas (2004), announcements from public utility firms 
(SIC code 4900-4999) and financial institutions (SIC code 6000-6999) are 
excluded from the sample because of these firms’ extensive regulations.
This screening procedure produced a sample size of 1,621 announcements. We 
further grouped these announcements by target country and industry, using the Fama 
French 12 industry classification system. Each country/industry group must have at least 
five announcements to determine early-movers (first 20 percent of the group), late-
movers (last 20 percent of the group), and followers (middle 60 percent of the group), 
following Carrow et al. (2004).2 The final sample consists of 173 completed cross-border 
acquisitions by publicly traded U.S. firms that announced transactions from January 1987 
through December 2004. 
Rival firms consist of members of the individual country/industry sample groups as 
well as externally matched rival firms. Similar to Barber and Lyon, (1996), Loughran and 
Ritter (1997), and Fee and Thomas (2004), we identified external rival firms based on 
industry, size, and operating performance. Specifically, we identified firms that had 
relevant information available on CRSP and Compustat but that were not part of our 
announcement firm sample. We first matched announcing firms with rival firms that 
shared the same 4-digit SIC code and had total assets between 25% and 200% of the 
sample firms’ total assets in the year prior to the announcement. Of the matching rival 
firms, we selected the one with the closest operating performance relative to the sample 
firms, measured in the year prior to the announcement.3 We divided cash flows by sales 
to obtain the operating performance measure (see Fee and Thomas (2004)). We relaxed 
the criteria if we could not find a rival firm. First, we allowed for matches by 2-digit SIC 
code, size, and operating performance, then we matched by 2-digit SIC code and 
operating performance, and finally we matched by 1-digit SIC code and operating 
performance. 
Table 2.1 explains the variables used in the paper’s analyses. Table 2.2 describes the 
distribution of the cross-border M&A announcements by year. Complete information was 
available on 173 announcements between 1987 and 2004. The vast majority (almost 90 
percent) of announcements took place in 1993 and thereafter, which is the time frame that 
Black (2000) calls the “international merger wave.” The frequency of annual cross-border 
acquisitions for our sample increased in 1995 with peaks in 1997 (12.72 percent of the 
total sample announcements), 1999 (15.03 percent of the total sample announcements), 
and 2004 (12.72 percent of the total sample announcements). 
Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics for the announcing bidder firms (Panel A) 
and their industry rivals (Panels B through D). Research and development expenses are 
higher for the announcing firms (US$ 299 million) compared to rival firms, especially 
compared to externally matched rival firms (US$ 180 million). In general, announcing 
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firms and rival firms appear to have similar characteristics, even after considering within 
sample matches and external matches.
2.4.2. Strategic Pioneers
It is well known that M&As occur in waves (see Brealey and Myers (2003); and 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005)), and so far literature has classified five distinct 
mergers waves: first wave, 1895 to 1903; second wave, 1920 to 1929; third wave, 1960 to 
1973; fourth wave, 1978 to 1989; and fifth wave, 1993 to present (Black (2000)). Since 
this fifth merger wave includes a significant percentage of cross-border M&As, Black 
(2000) classifies it as the first international merger wave. The vast majority of our sample 
falls within Black’s timeframe for the international merger wave. Following the approach 
by Carow et al. (2004), we classify the earliest 20 percent of acquisitions in our 
industry/country sample groups as early-movers, the latest 20 percent as late-movers, and 
the remaining 60 percent as followers. Among the early-movers, we differentiate between 
strategic pioneers and other early-movers. Kerin et al. (1992) and Carow et al. (2004) 
point out that being a first-mover alone might not provide abnormal returns. Rather, it 
might be important for early-movers to possess proprietary information. One prominent 
area of proprietary information is technological know-how, and we classify early-movers 
with above industry-average levels of technological leadership, as proxied by R&D 
expenses relative to annual sales in the year prior to the cross-border acquisition 
announcement, as strategic pioneers. R&D expenses and annual sales are obtained from 
Compustat. 
2.4.3. Announcement Effects
We utilize standard event study methodology to obtain both the bidder firms’ and 
rival firms’ announcement returns at the time of the bidder firm’s announcement. This 
model estimates the abnormal return for Security i on Day t, AR
it
, by subtracting the 
security’s expected return, E(R
it
), from the actual return, R
it
. The expected return is 
computed using Fama’s (1976) market model.
E(R
it
) = α
i 
+ β
i 
R
mt (1)
AR
it 
= R
it 
– E(R
it
) (2)
The estimated parameters α
i 
and β
i 
in Equation (1) are computed using an OLS regression 
of security returns, R
it
, with market returns, R
mt
, during the estimation period, where R
mt 
is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index to proxy for the market index on Day t. 
The estimation period used in the OLS regression spans from Day -300 to Day -50, where 
Day 0 denotes the event day – that is, the day on which the cross-border M&A is 
announced. For more reliable coefficient estimates, we include only firms that have at 
least 100 days worth of return data available. 
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2.4.4. Cultural Distance
For hypotheses 2a and 2b, we perform a cross-sectional regression to test whether the 
abnormal stock returns of early-movers with significant technological know-how are 
related to Hofstede’s (1980) cultural distance measures. Following Kogut and Singh 
(1988), we combine Hofstede’s four most common cultural dimensions, which are 
individualism (IDV), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), power distance (PDI), and 
masculinity (MAS), into the following composite index distance measure:
Hofstede’s Cultural Distance Measure = 
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where SB,i is the bidder country score for Dimension i, ST,i is the target country score for 
Dimension i, and Vi is the variance of the index score of Dimension i.
4 When we divide 
our results for the cultural distance measure into high and low cultural distance between 
the target country and the United States, our grouping corresponds with that of Benou, 
Gleason, and Madura (2007) who categorize cultural distance using hierarchical cluster 
analysis. 
2.4.5. Intra-Industry Effects
To test hypotheses 3a through 3f, we identify rival firms by matching our sample 
bidder firms with firms from the Compustat database that share the same 4-digit SIC 
code. Because rival firms might react differently to cross-border M&A announcements 
depending whether the rival is already invested in the target country, we differentiate 
between rival firms that are already invested in the target country or its geographic area 
(Prior = 1) and rival firms that are not (Prior = 0).5
Rival firms’ stock price reactions are measured around the event dates that are 
examined for cross-border bidder firms. 
2.4.6. Control Variables
Following the previous literature, we control for the most commonly used variables in 
the cross-sectional regressions of this study. Specifically, we control for the following 
variables: 6
Cash Takes the value of one if the transaction is completely financed by cash 
payment, and zero otherwise. We typically observe positive relations 
between cash payments and wealth gains to both bidder and target firms 
(see for example Harris and Ravenscraft (1991)). The method of payment 
information is obtained from the SDC database.
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Prior Takes the value of one if the bidder firm has any previous involvement in 
the target country or its geographic area7 at the time of the cross-border 
M&A announcement, and zero otherwise. This information is obtained 
from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. 
RPrior Takes the value of one if the rival firm has any previous involvement in he 
target country or its geographic area at the time of the cross-border M&A 
announcement, and zero otherwise. This information is obtained from the 
Directory of Corporate Affiliations.
Exrate Indicates the relative strength of the target country's currency with respect 
to the U.S. dollar. The strength of the home currency versus the foreign 
currency can impact the cost of the cross-border M&A transaction (see for 
example Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000)). Similar to Harris and 
Ravenscraft (1991), we calculate the strength of the target currency with 
respect to the U.S. currency by subtracting the average exchange rate (in 
terms of U.S. dollar) in the announcement year from the average exchange 
rate (in terms of U.S. dollar) during the sample period and dividing the 
result by the average exchange rate during the sample period. Positive 
results indicate that the foreign currency was stronger during the 
announcement year than during the average sample period, while negative 
results point to the opposite. The exchange rate data are obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Bank. 
BProfit Indicates the bidder firm’s profitability in the year prior to the cross-
border M&A announcement, and is calculated by dividing the bidder’s 
annual income by its total assets. This information is found on Compustat.
RProfit Indicates the rival firm’s profitability in the year prior to the cross-border 
M&A announcement, and is calculated by dividing the rival firm’s annual 
income by its total assets. This information is found on Compustat.
RelSize Indicates the transaction value of the acquisition divided by the natural 
logarithm of the announcing firm’s total assets in the year prior to the 
announcement.
Expansion Takes the value of one if the announcement took place during an 
expansionary economy and zero otherwise.8
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2.5. Results
2.5.1. Univariate Analysis
2.5.1.1. Bidder Firms
In Table 2.4 we report the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 
our sample of announcing firms during the 2-day (0,+1) and 3-day (-1,+1) time windows 
surrounding the announcement date. Panel A shows that the 3-day mean and median 
cumulative abnormal returns for our entire bidder sample are -0.68% and -0.31%, 
respectively. However, the CARs are not statistically significant. This result is consistent 
with Bruner’s (2004) survey of previous cross-border M&A research. He found that, on 
average, the announcement effect to US bidder firms is not significant. By breaking down 
the mean and median CARs by type of announcing firm, we find that early-movers have 
a negative mean CAR and a significantly negative median CAR. Further, mean and 
median CARs are negative for followers and positive for late-movers. The non-
significant mean CAR for early-movers is consistent with the research by Kerin et al. 
(1992) and Carow et al. (2004) who propose that being a first-mover alone does not 
provide abnormal returns. Instead, the authors suggest, early-movers must possess 
proprietary information to earn abnormal returns. Early-movers with proprietary 
information are called strategic pioneers. Our early-movers qualify as strategic pioneers if 
they possess proprietary information resulting from R&D investments. Specifically, in 
the year prior to the announcement our strategic pioneers spend more money on research 
and development (R&D) than the industry average. 
According to Hypothesis 1a, if the early-mover advantage hypothesis holds in cross-
border acquisitions, we expect to find positive mean CARs for early-movers, and 
strategic pioneers in particular. However, we show that mean CARs for early-movers and 
strategic pioneers are negative and not significant. In Hypothesis 1b we postulate that 
late-movers should have positive mean CARs if the late-mover advantage hypothesis 
holds in cross-border acquisitions. In fact, we find positive mean CARs for late-movers 
during the announcement period, though the results are not statistically significant.
Although the individual CARs for early-movers, followers, and late-movers are not 
significant, Panel B shows that the difference in the 3-day mean CAR between early-
movers and late-movers is significant at the 10 percent level. These results indicate that 
late-movers experience superior announcement returns compared to early-movers, which 
provides some support for the late-mover advantage theory (Hypothesis 1b).
In Panel C we further differentiate between late-movers with above- and below-
average R&D spending. We show that only late-movers with low R&D expenses do in 
fact outperform early-movers, and strategic pioneers in particular. The differences in 
mean CARs between late-movers with high R&D expenses and strategic pioneers are not 
significant. Neither are the differences between late-movers with low R&D and early-
movers with low R&D. Overall this analysis implies that in cross-border M&A, the 
announcement by a late-mover with low R&D investment results in more favorable 
abnormal returns than the announcement by an early-mover, especially if the early-mover 
invests heavily in R&D. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) provide a reasonable 
explanation for this result, suggesting that late-movers might be able to free-ride on early-
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movers’ investments in R&D. When we examine the sub-samples of bidder firms with 
high and low R&D spending, we notice that only three late-movers (9 percent of the late-
mover sample) and six followers (5.6 percent of the follower sample) do in fact spend 
heavily in R&D, compared to 12 early-movers (37.5 percent of early-mover sample). It 
seems reasonable to conclude that bidder firms in cross-border M&As benefit from 
conserving R&D expenses if they can imitate products or processes later instead of 
designing them themselves, consistent with Shankar, Carpenter, and Krishnamurti 
(1998).
Panel D indicates that the mean CAR of the strategic pioneers is not significantly 
different from the mean CAR of early-movers with below-average R&D expenses. Given 
the very small sample sizes associated with strategic pioneers, we proceed focusing on 
early-movers in general rather than strategic pioneers for our remaining analyses. 
For Hypotheses 2a and 2b we examine our sample of bidder firms that acquire target 
firms in countries with great cultural distance. Specifically, we are looking at the impact 
of cultural distance on announcement returns. We predict that cultural distance could 
have either a positive (Hypothesis 2a) or a negative (Hypothesis 2b) impact on the 
announcement return of early-movers. In Panel E we show that in the sub-sample of 
bidder firms with high cultural distance, the 3-day mean CAR is negative for early-
movers (-4.685%), significant at the 1 percent level, and positive (5.108%) for late-
movers, significant at the 10 percent level.9 The mean CAR for followers is negative but 
not significant. The difference in the 3-day mean CARs between early-movers and late-
movers is highly significant at the 1 percent level (t = -4.24). In addition, the differences 
in the 3-day mean CARs between early-movers and followers, and late-movers and 
followers are significant at the 5 percent level. These results suggest that among bidder 
firms that choose target firms in countries with great cultural distance, only late-movers 
experience positive 3-day mean CARs and outperform followers as well as early-movers. 
Further, followers outperform early-movers. One reasonable implication of this 
observation is that greater differences in countries’ cultures complicate the integration 
process of the target firm. Our results, which provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2b, 
also support findings by Datta and Puia (1995).  In particular, our univariate results 
suggest that late-movers not only benefit from early-movers’ R&D but also from their 
possible mistakes and challenges when operating in a culturally different country. Late-
movers may study these mistakes and problems encountered by the early-movers and 
learn from them, thereby ultimately experiencing stronger announcement effects than the 
early-movers.
2.5.1.2. Rival Firms
Table 2.5 shows industry rivals’ responses to announcements by bidder firms. Panel 
A provides cumulative abnormal returns of industry rival firms during the 2-day (0,+1) 
and 3-day (-1,+1) time windows around the announcement date. The 3-day cumulative
abnormal mean and median returns to the rival firms are -0.348%, and -0.164%, 
respectively. Both values are statistically significant. More in-depth analysis shows that 
the significantly negative returns originate primarily from rivals of followers. Mean and 
median CARs for rivals of followers are statistically significant. The mean CARs of 
rivals of early-movers are negative while the mean CARs of rivals of late-movers are 
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positive. However, these results are not statistically significant. This finding parallels the 
results for announcing firms in Table 2.4, showing more negative CARs for early-movers 
than for late-movers, and it provides some evidence of a contagion effect in the bidder 
firm merger announcements. 
Further, Panel A also provides some support for Hypothesis 3d. The previous table 
suggests a late-mover advantage in cross-border M&As. If followers can learn and 
benefit from early-movers and begin to establish barriers upon entry into the foreign 
country, then rivals to followers might not be able to benefit from internalization benefits 
themselves. We know from the previous table (Table 2.4, Panel D) that followers with 
high levels of R&D observe normal announcement returns. Because rivals to followers 
experience significantly negative announcement returns, we conclude that the market 
believes that innovative followers, as later market entrants, are able to successfully 
internalize their intangible assets and to establish barriers to entry. Innovative followers 
are therefore a unique subgroup of bidder firms, as they combine elements from late-
mover advantage theory (by learning from early-movers) and early-mover advantage 
theory (by creating barriers of entry).
Panel B displays differences in means between rival firms depending on the type of 
bidder firm. We find that the rival response to announcements of late-movers is 
significantly less negative than the rival reaction to announcements of followers. 
Although there is no statistical difference in mean CARs between the rivals of early-
movers and the rivals of late-movers, we do find differences in subsequent sub-samples 
when we differentiate between levels of cultural distance. Specifically, Panel C shows 
that if cultural distance between the U.S. and the target country is large, the response of
rival firms is significantly more negative if the bidder firm is an early-mover compared to 
a late-mover. This result is again in line with our previous findings regarding the impact 
of cultural distance on bidder firms, and it provides further evidence for a contagion 
effect.  This evidence supports Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) who note that mergers are 
signals of fundamental changes in conditions facing the industry. The generally negative 
announcing firm CAR, and the negative rival CAR, imply that the merger announcement 
sends an industry-wide signal that causes investors to re-evaluate other firms in the same 
industry.  For example, rival firm investors may fear that industry conditions could lead 
their firms to engage in similar risky cross-border mergers that are value-destroying. This 
fear is more pronounced in early-mover rivals than in late-mover rivals. In general, our 
findings are more suggestive of a late-mover advantage rather than an early-mover 
advantage in cross-border M&A announcements. In addition, we have also shown that 
level of R&D as well as cultural distance impact announcement returns. Specifically, our 
results suggest that late-movers can observe and learn from early-movers’ R&D and from 
their obstacles and mistakes encountered when entering a culturally distant country.
2.5.2. Regression Analysis
2.5.2.1. Bidder Firms
Table 2.6 presents regression results for the bidder firm sample. Specifically, we 
regress bidder firms’ 3-day mean CAR on R&D expenses relative to total sales in the
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year prior to the announcement, on the Hofstede cultural distance index, on type of bidder 
firm (i.e., early-mover, follower, late-mover), and on other explanatory variables.10
In Model 1 we focus on early-movers and their interaction with R&D and cultural 
distance. We find that higher spending in R&D has a significant negative impact on the 
announcement effects of early-movers, which implies that being a strategic mover 
adversely affects shareholder wealth at least at the time of the announcement. Confirming 
our univariate results, early-movers in our sample do not benefit from internalization 
benefits. This finding suggests that the benefit from possessing intangible assets does not 
fully compensate for the early-mover’s costs of entering a foreign country. Dewenter 
(1995) lists several cost disadvantages which include “establishing local contacts for 
suppliers and distributors; learning local regulations in areas such as job safety, 
environmental protection and new product approval; coordinating and communicating 
across geographic and cultural distances; and, managing exchange rate exposure” 
(p.483), among others. 
Model 2 shows the significantly positive impact of high R&D expenditure on 
followers. This finding is in line with our univariate results, where followers with high 
levels of R&D experienced positive mean CARs while followers with low levels of R&D 
experienced negative mean CARs (Table 2.4, Panel C). Followers can take advantage of 
observing early-movers and learning from their mistakes, and the results suggest that 
followers can enter the foreign market while there still are profitable targets available. As 
stated by Shankar et al. (1998), later entrants can outperform early-movers through 
superior innovation in product or strategy. Model 2 further indicates that followers with 
high levels of R&D encounter significantly negative wealth effects if there is a large 
cultural distance between the U.S. and the target country. This implies that the challenges 
to successfully integrate a target firm outweigh internationalization benefits for 
innovative followers as the cultural differences between the host and the home country 
widen.
Model 3 indicates that being a late-mover creates positive wealth effects during cross-
border M&A announcements. The positive coefficient for being a late-mover corresponds 
with the positive CARs of late-movers in the univariate analysis. Luo (1998) suggests 
that late-movers can learn from earlier movers’ mistakes and benefit from earlier movers’ 
efforts of educating local government, suppliers, and customers. Therefore, late-movers 
can outperform earlier movers. The intensity of R&D spending and cultural differences 
does not create any wealth effects for late-movers. 
The findings in Table 2.6 together with our univariate results provide further support 
for a late-mover advantage in cross-border acquisitions and are in line with Hypothesis 
1b. We also find some additional support for Hypothesis 2b with respect to followers, 
indicating that followers benefit from internalization as long as the difference in cultural 
climate between the target and the home country is low.
In Table 2.7 we expand on the previous models by controlling for investors’ legal 
rights as introduced by LaPorta, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 
1998) [LLSV]. If the Hofstede index captures aspects of national culture and is not 
subsumed in LLSV’s control variables, then our regression findings from the previous 
table should continue to hold. We also control for bidder firms’ previous experience in 
the target country and its geographic area.
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Models 1 through 3 include the first legal rights variable, Civil, to indicate that the 
bidder firm acquires a target from a civil law country. LLSV have shown that shareholder 
protection is lower in countries with civil law than in countries with common law. Rossi 
and Volpin (2004) show that takeover markets are more active in countries with better 
investor protection.  Less competition in civil law countries can reduce the acquisition 
cost for foreign targets and therefore increase the potential profit to the bidder firm. Our 
findings are robust to the inclusion of the target country’s legal system.
Models 4 through 6 include the second legal law variable, Corruption, which is 
another LLSV measure for shareholder protection. Again, we find that our results remain 
unchanged.
Lastly, Model 7 includes a variable, Prior, to control for previous experience in the 
same geographic area as the target country or the target country itself. We show that 
representation either in the target country or its geographic region prior to the 
announcement is associated with positive announcement effects. Thus, these findings 
suggest that investors perceive cross-border acquisitions more favorably if the bidder 
firm is already familiar with the foreign market and its specific culture and, thereby, able 
to evade the learning curve of a new market entrant. 
2.5.2.2. Rival Firms
Table 2.8 displays the regression results for the rival firms. In particular, we regress 
the rival firm’s mean 3-day CAR on the bidder firm’s 3-day CAR, bidder firm’s R&D 
expense relative to total sales in the year prior to the announcement, the Hofstede cultural 
distance index, type of bidder firm (i.e., early-mover, follower, late-mover), and on other
explanatory variables. We find that the coefficient for bidder firms’ CARs is positive 
throughout all models, significant at the 1 percent level. Supporting our univariate results, 
this finding suggests that the rival CAR tends to move in the same direction as the bidder 
CAR, indicative of a contagion effect for the rival firms in our sample. Therefore, a 
negative bidder firm CAR (complete sample, early-movers, followers) is associated with 
a negative rival firm CAR, and a positive bidder firm CAR (late-mover) elicits positive 
rival firm response. This implies that the merger event provides information about 
industry conditions (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)), prompting investors to re-assess the 
values of other firms in the same industry. 
Also consistent with the univariate results, the rival response is significantly lower for 
mergers involving greater cultural distance. We further find a lower, or more negative, 
rival firm reaction to takeovers involving bidder firms with strong intangibles. 
While the rival firm market reaction has a tendency to move in the same direction as 
the bidder firm’s market response, the regressions also provide some evidence of a 
competitive response in certain cases. For example, Panel A shows that the rival firm 
CAR is positively related to announcements made by early-movers, including early-
movers who are strategic pioneers (i.e., those with high R&D).  Recall from the bidder 
regression analysis in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 that early-movers with high levels of R&D 
experienced significantly lower CARs.  Thus, these factors impact the bidder and rival 
firm response in opposite ways.  These findings are consistent with the earlier results 
indicating that the costs of being a pioneer bidder outweigh the potential benefits, and 
suggest that rival firms can benefit when the announcing firm loses. Rival firms benefit 
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most significantly when the strategic pioneer acquires targets in culturally distant 
countries, where cost disadvantages (Dewenter (1995)) for these pioneers are likely to be 
great. This finding further supports Hypothesis 3c, indicating that rival firms earn 
positive CARs during early-mover announcements if late-mover advantages exist and if it 
is beneficial to wait and learn from early-movers’ mistakes.
In Panel B, similar competitive responses appear to occur for rivals of followers with 
high intangibles.  In this case, followers with high R&D experienced higher CARs, while 
the rival firm reaction to these followers is significantly lower. This finding provides 
additional support to Hypothesis 3d and suggests that investors perceive innovative 
followers to be able to create barriers of entry by captioning scarce assets or by 
increasing switching costs (Lieberman and Montgomery (1988)), thereby leaving rivals 
with fewer or none other valuable investment alternatives (Carow et al. (2004)). Panel B 
further shows that rival firms experience negative CARs in response to innovative 
follower announcements if cultural distance is great. Our results suggest that investors 
perceive the acquisition to be value destroying and they appear to be concerned that rivals 
might engage in similarly value destroying activities. 
The regressions in Panel C highlight the rival firm response to late-mover and 
follower announcements. Late-mover and follower rivals experience significantly lower 
announcement effects compared to early-mover rivals, which implies that rival firms 
benefit most when the bidder firm is an early-mover. This results suggests that rival firms 
can learn from the early-mover’s mistakes and incorporate this knowledge in a 
subsequent acquisition at a time when valuable investments are still available (Carow et 
al. (2004)), the foreign market and government are sympathetic towards US firms (Luo 
(1998)), existing products can be enhanced (Scherer (1980)), and barriers of entry can 
still be established (Lieberman and Montgomery (1988)). Panel C therefore provides 
additional support for Hypotheses 3c and 3d.
2.6. Conclusions
In examining the acquiring firm shareholder wealth effects in cross-border takeovers, 
we find evidence that cross-border mergers and acquisitions are wealth-destroying if the 
announcing firm is an early-mover, especially if the firm’s R&D expenses are high. Thus, 
internalization benefits appear not to be large enough to compensate early-movers for the 
costs of entering the foreign market. 
While early-movers seem to experience value destruction from internalizing their 
intangibles, we find evidence that cross-border acquisitions provide advantages to later 
market entrants (Hypothesis 1b). We show that innovative followers (i.e., those with high 
R&D spending) experience significantly positive CARs upon the announcement of a 
cross-border acquisition. The potential benefits to these innovative followers are 
plentiful. First, followers can learn from early-movers and thereby avoid costly mistakes. 
Further, followers can benefit from early-movers’ groundwork of preparing the foreign 
market and government for the new U.S. presence in their country. Finally, followers can 
improve products and/or production offered by the early-movers which allows followers 
to ensure market share. Followers might also enter the foreign market early enough to 
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secure loyal workers, suppliers, and customers. However, these followers enjoy positive 
CARs only if they expand into countries with a national culture similar to the U.S., where 
successful integration of the target firm is relatively easy (Hypothesis 2b). 
Rival firms tend to experience similar CARs as the announcing firm which is 
indicative of a contagion effect. Specifically, cross-border acquisitions announcements 
appear to provide information about industry conditions that prompt investors to re-assess 
values of other firms in the same industry. We further find some evidence for certain 
competitive responses. While cross-border acquisitions generally appear to be value-
destroying to early-movers, they increase value for the rival firms (hypothesis 3c). 
Consistent with our earlier findings, it is beneficial to wait and possibly learn from early-
movers. Rivals of followers, on the other hand, experience negative announcement 
CARs. This finding suggests that followers enjoy great benefits and may be able to create 
barriers of entry which makes it harder for rival firms to subsequently enter the foreign 
market (Hypothesis 3d). 
2.7. Future Research
There are several avenues within the same research stream that can further be 
explored. For example, expanding the externally matched rivals to obtain a broader 
dataset would make the results more generalizable, and would enhance the ability to 
examine differences between the rival set of firms that engage in cross-border M&As 
themselves and those that do not. If there are significant differences between the sets of 
rival firms, one could further investigate if investors can forecast which rival firms 
subsequently engage in cross-border merger announcements (similar to Song and 
Walking (2005)).  Also, examining the factors that influence the likelihood of becoming 
an early versus late mover in cross-border acquisitions is of interest.  Furthermore, an 
evaluation of the long-run stock price and operating performance of the bidder firms and 
their rivals, based on their early versus late mover status would shed additional light on 
the shareholder wealth effects of cross-border mergers. Specifically, we are interested in 
whether the short-run findings associated with level of R&D and cultural distance 
continue to hold in the long-run, or if the anticipated performance deviates over a three or 
five year period after the announcement.
2.8. Notes
1 Hofstede’s cultural typology is widely used in the social science literature, and the 
Social Science Citation Index by Thomson lists Geert Hofstede among the top 100 
most cited authors. Sondergaard (1994, 2002) addresses common concerns about the 
cultural dimensions and finds validation in Hofstede’s approach. Specifically, he 
finds that Hofstede’s results were confirmed in replication studies by other 
researchers as well as in Hofstede’s own 2001 publication, and that the dimensions 
are frequently being used as a paradigm in studies that involve cultural differences. A 
detailed description of the typology is available in the appendix of this paper.
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2 We allowed for adjustments when clustering with respect to the announcement date 
existed. The final distribution by type of announcing firm is as follows: 32 early-
movers, 108 followers, and 33 late-movers.
3 We chose to match each sample firm with one external rival to keep the number of 
firms, for which we hand-collected the Prior variable, at a manageable level. 
4 Kogut and Singh (1988) point out that although this particular measure creates 
weights related to the index variance, there should be no theoretical correlation 
between any possible measurement errors and other independent variables.
5 This information is obtained from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations.
6 We controlled for additional variables but found them not to be significant and, 
therefore, we dropped them from the models. Specifically, we also controlled for: 
HOSTILE (dummy variable that takes the value of one if the transaction was hostile, 
and zero if otherwise or if not indicated), DEV (dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the target country is a developed country, and zero otherwise), EXRATE
(relative strength of the target country’s currency with respect to the U.S. dollar), and 
SIZE indicates bidder firm’s size in the year prior to the cross-border M&A 
announcement, and it is measured by the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. 
This information is found on Compustat.
7 Specifically, we divide geographic area into the following regions: Africa, Asia, 
Australia, Europe, North America, and South America. Our results do not differ 
significantly when we substitute PRIOR for experience in the target country only, 
experience in the same Hofstede area, or any previous international experience by the 
bidder firm.
8 Recessions occurred from July 1990 through March 1991, and from March 2001 
through November 2001. All other time periods were expansions.
9 The difference between the (0,+1) and (-1,+1) window seem to be large. We think 
that the small sample size might be the reason for this observation.
10 We also test Hypothesis 1a using a different indicator for Strategic Pioneers. 
Specifically, we look at early Movers that pay for the acquisition of the foreign target 
in cash. Carow et al. (2004) state that bidder firms that pay for the acquisition in cash 
are more likely to experience superior stock price performance. In our sample, the 
mean CARs for Early Movers that pay in cash are positive but not significant, and 
their median CARs are negative. Further, there is no significant difference between 
the mean CARs of Early Movers that pay in cash and all other firms that pay in cash.
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Table 1.1. Variables used in univariate and regression analyses
This table defines the different variables used in this paper’s univariate and regression
analysis. 
Variables Definitions
1. RD Variable indicating the bidder firm’s expense 
for research and development relative to total sales in the 
year prior to the announcement.
2. AdE Variable indicating the bidder firm’s expense 
for advertisement relative to total sales in the 
year prior to the announcement.
3. HCD Cultural distance measure based on Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions. See section 4.4. of this paper for the exact 
computation.
4. CDRD Interaction variable between cultural distance (CD) and
research and development expenses (RD).
5. CDAdE Interaction variable between cultural distance (CD) and
advertisement expenses (AdE).
6. Size Natural logarithm of bidder firm’s total assets in the year 
prior to the announcement.
7. Cash Dummy variable indicating that the acquisition was 
financed 100% using cash.
8. Exrate Indicates the relative strength of the target country's 
currency with respect to the U.S. dollar.
9. Dev Dummy variable indicating that the target country is a 
developing country.
10. Bprofit Announcing firm’s profitability, measured as the annual 
income divided by total assets in the year prior to the
announcement.
11. Related Dummy variable indicating that the bidder firm and target
firm operate in the same industry as measured by the
4-digit SIC code.
46
Table 1.1. Variables used in univariate and regression analyses (cont.)
This table defines the different variables used in this paper’s univariate and regression
analyses.
Variables Definitions
12. Prev Dummy variable indicating that the bidder firm had a 
previous announcement within our sample.
13. dGNI Difference between the U.S. GNI (gross national income)
and the target country’s GNI.
14. Prior1 (Int’l) Dummy variable indicating that the bidder firm has prior
international experience. 
15. Prior2 (Target) Dummy variable indicating that the bidder firm has prior
experience in the target country. 
16. Prior3 (Geo) Dummy variable indicating that the bidder firm has prior
experience in either the target country or its geographic
area.
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Table 1.2. Distribution by target country
The number of sample firms announcing cross-border M&As in a particular target 
country and the cultural distance (CD) measures for each target country are shown below.
                                                   Cumulative      Cumulative
Country       Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent CD
                
Algeria              1        0.21             1         0.21
Argentina           5        1.07             6         1.28 1.67
Australia          20        4.27            26         5.56 0.02
Austria             2       0.43            28         5.98 1.45
Bahamas              1        0.21            29         6.20
Belgium              7        1.50            36         7.69 1.51
Bermuda              1        0.21            37         7.91
Bolivia              1        0.21            38         8.12
Brazil               8        1.71            46         9.83 2.17
British Virgin Island   1        0.21            47        10.04
Canada              77       16.45           124        26.50 0.13
Chile                3        0.64           127        27.14 3.82
China               4        0.85           131        27.99 3.12
Denmark              5        1.07           136       29.06 2.09
Egypt                2       0.43           138        29.49 2.31
Finland              5        1.07           143        30.56 1.35
France              29        6.20           172        36.75 1.54
Germany             47       10.04           219        46.79 0.44
Ghana                1        0.21          220        47.01 3.09
Hong Kong            4        0.85           224        47.86 2.44
Iceland              1        0.21           225        48.08 8.07
India                4        0.85           229        48.93 1.53
Indonesia            2        0.43           231        49.36 3.49
Ireland            9        1.92           240        51.28 0.34
Israel              17        3.63           257        54.91 1.67
Italy                9        1.92          266        56.84 0.57
Japan                2        0.43           268        57.26 2.70
Malaysia             1        0.21           269        57.48 4.03
Mexico               4       0.85           273        58.33 3.08
Netherlands          17        3.63           290        61.97 1.70
New Zealand           1        0.21           291        62.18 0.24
Norway               2        0.43           293        62.61 2.31
Pakistan             1        0.21           294        62.82 3.06
Peru                 2        0.43           296        63.25 3.78
Philippine           1        0.21           297        63.46 2.97
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Table 1.2. Distribution by target country (cont.)
The number of sample firms announcing cross-border M&As in a particular target 
country and the cultural distance (CD) measures for each target country are shown below.
                                                       Cumulative      Cumulative
Country       Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent CD
                
Portugal             1        0.21           298        63.68 4.24
Puerto Rico           3        0.64           301        64.32
Russian Federation     3        0.64           304        64.96 4.13
Singapore            1        0.21           305        65.17 3.56
South Africa           2        0.43           307        65.60 0.34
South Korea           4        0.85           311        66.45 3.58
Spain                6        1.28           317       67.74 1.84
Sweden               8        1.71           325        69.44 2.63
Switzerland         10        2.14           335        71.58 0.36
Taiwan               4        0.85           339        72.44 2.99
Thailand             2        0.43           341        72.86 3.18
Trinidad&Tobaco       1        0.21           342        73.08 2.63
United Kingdom         124       26.50           466        99.57 0.08
Venezuela 1 0.21 467 99.78 4.05
Zambia 1 0.21 468 100.00 2.40
49
Table 1.3. Distribution by year of announcement
The number of sample firms announcing cross-border M&As in a particular year over the 
time frame from 1987 to 2004 is shown below.
                                                                   Cumulative     Cumulative
Year    Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent
1987           8        1.71             8         1.71
1988           7        1.50            15         3.21
1989          11        2.35            26         5.56
1990           8        1.71            34         7.26
1991          10        2.14            44         9.40
1992           5        1.07            49        10.47
1993          11        2.35           60        12.82
1994          13        2.78            73        15.60
1995          26        5.56            99        21.15
1996          30        6.41           129        27.56
1997          40        8.55           169        36.11
1998          53       11.32           222        47.44
1999         40        8.55           262        55.98
2000          65       13.89           327        69.87
2001          38        8.12           365        77.99
2002          30        6.41           395        84.40
2003          28        5.98           423        90.38
2004          45        9.62           468       100.00
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Table 1.4. Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables
This table provides information about the mean, median, and standard deviation for the 
main variables of interest, R&D, advertisement expense, and cultural distance, as well as 
for control variables that are used in the paper’s regression analyses. The variables used 
in this table are defined in Table 1.
Variable      N            Mean          Median         Std Dev
RD          466       0.09      0.02       0.37
AdE          466       0.01               0.00       0.03
CD          460       0.89       0.34       1.11
dGNI     444        13840.99        11550.00         7008.50
Size        468       7.05       6.99       1.83
Cash        468       0.78       1.00       0.42
Exrate      463      89.06       1.31     732.12
Dev      468       0.11               0.00       0.31
BProfit     468       0.04       0.06       0.14
Related        468       0.36               0.00       0.48
Prev        468       0.43               0.00       0.50
Prior1 (Geo) 356 0.62 1.00 0.49
Prior2 (Target) 356 0.33 0.00 0.47
Prior3 (Int’l) 356 0.68 1.00 0.47
51
Table 1.5. Cumulative abnormal returns associated with cross-border M&As
This table indicates the cumulative 2-day (0, +1) and 3-day (-1, +1) abnormal mean and 
median announcement returns for the full sample as well as for various subsamples. 
We conduct significance test using Student’s t statistic and its associated p-value for the 
mean abnormal returns, and Wilcoxon signed-rank test and its associated p-value for the 
median abnormal returns.  
           2-day CAR           3-day CAR
Value p-value Value p-value
Full sample (N = 468)
Mean abnormal return 0.005* (0.10) 0.004 (0.22)
Median abnormal return 0.003* (0.07) 0.002 (0.25)
Low Advertisement Expense (N = 381)
Mean abnormal return 0.006 (0.12) 0.003 (0.40)
Median abnormal return 0.004* (0.07) 0.002 (0.49)
Unrelated merger (N = 298)
Mean abnormal return 0.009** (0.02) 0.005** (0.02)
Median abnormal return 0.008** (0.04) 0.006** (0.03)
Developed Country (N = 417)
Mean abnormal return 0.005 (0.14) 0.005 (0.22)    
Median abnormal return 0.004* (0.07) 0.003 (0.22)
Cash (N = 363)
Mean abnormal return 0.008*** (0.00) 0.009*** (0.01)
Median abnormal return 0.004*** (0.02) 0.004*** (0.03)
Low CD (N = 413)
Mean abnormal return 0.006 (0.11) 0.005 (0.17)
Median abnormal return 0.004** (0.04) 0.003 (0.17)
No previous sample announcement (N = 268)
Mean abnormal return 0.011** (0.02) 0.009* (0.07)
Median abnormal return 0.005** (0.01) 0.006* (0.07)
Germany (N = 47)
Mean abnormal return (%) 0.026*** (0.01) 0.028*** (0.01)
Median abnormal return (%) 0.011** (0.04) 0.017** (0.03)
Australia (N = 20)
Mean abnormal return (%) 0.013* (0.07) 0.024* (0.06)
Median abnormal return (%) 0.009 (0.13) 0.007* (0.08)
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.6. Ordinary least squares analysis explaining 3-day cumulative abnormal 
returns of bidder firms in response to cross-border M&A announcements
This table shows the results of two multivariate regression analyses to explain bidder firms’ cumulative 
abnormal returns in cross-border M&A announcements. Model 1 focuses on the variables of interest, which 
are intangible assets, cultural distance, and the interaction between them. Model 2 further includes some 
common control variables. The variables used in this table are defined in Table 1.
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.0008 0.0117
(0.21) (-0.43)
RD -0.0848*** -0.0754***
(-4.38) (-3.51)
AdE -0.0672 0.0561
(-0.75) (0.44)
CD -0.0087** -0.0061
(-2.48) (-1.3)
CDRD -0.1141*** -0.1062***
(-3.94) (-3.41)
CDAdE 0.0227 -0.0050
(0.25) (-0.04)
Size -0.0063***
(-2.67)
Cash 0.0245**
(2.03)
Exrate 0.0000
(-0.53)
Dev -0.0103
(-0.73)
Bprofit 0.0209
(0.86)
Related -0.0158
(-1.74)
Industry Dummies Yes
Year Dummies Yes
N 458 453
Adj. R2 0.0327 0.1134
F-value 4.05*** 1.59**
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.7. Robustness tests for ordinary least squares analysis explaining 3-day 
cumulative abnormal returns of bidder firms in response to cross-border M&A 
announcements
This table shows the results of additional multivariate regression analyses to explain bidder firms’ 
cumulative abnormal returns in cross-border M&A announcements. Model 1 examines the impact of 
previous bidder announcements on the 3-day CAR, and Model 2 examines the impact of differences in 
wage levels between bidder and target countries on the 3-day CAR. Model 3 and Model 4 control for 
LLSV’s law-related variables. Specifically, in Model 3 we include Civil, which is a dummy variable equal 
to 1.0 if the target country practices civil law. In Model 4 we include Corruption, an index ranging from 0 
(low protection against corruption) to 10 (high protection against corruption). The variables used in this 
table are defined in Table 1.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.0065 0.0037 -0.0082 -0.0205
(1.27) (0.50) (-1.43) (-0.88)
RD -0.0855*** -0.0767*** -0.0941*** -0.0908***
(-4.37) (-3.71) (-4.73) (-4.91)
AdE -0.0770 0.0344 -0.0713 -0.0440
(-0.86) (-0.38) (-0.80) (-0.48)
CD -0.0081** -0.0079* -0.0148*** -0.0071
(-2.29) (-1.94) (-3.16) (-1.57)
CDRD -0.1145*** -0.1026*** -0.1288*** -0.1236***
(-3.96) (-3.41) (-4.29) (-4.32)
CDAdE 0.0391 0.0347 -0.0576 -0.0497
(0.42) (0.36) (-0.72) (-0.61)
Prev -0.0133**
(-1.98)
dGNI -2.61e-07
(-0.53)
Civil 0.1952**
(2.30)
Corruption 0.0024
(0.88)
N 458 436 447 447
Adj. R2 0.0405 0.0287 0.0468 0.0372
F-value 3.50*** 2.38** 4.26*** 4.38***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.8. Calendar-time returns
This table provides results for the calendar-time returns. The calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns are 
determined by regressing the abnormal portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model:
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp(Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept       
In this regression, Rpt is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (portfolios are built equally 
weighted, EW, and value weighted, VW), Rft is the monthly risk-free return as measured by the 3-month T-
bill rate, Rmt is the monthly return on the market index as measured by the VW CRSP index, SMBt is the 
difference between returns of portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, and HMLt is the difference between 
returns of portfolios of high book-to-market (BM) stocks and low BM stocks. ap, bp, sp, and hp are the 
regression’s parameter estimates. The intercept ap is of special importance because it measures the average 
monthly abnormal portfolio return. If the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model can explain the portfolio 
excess return, then the intercept should yield a value of zero. Values significantly different from zero 
consequently represent abnormal returns. 
Panel A: Full Sample
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.3204*** 1.2910*** 1.2739*** 1.0813*** 1.1379*** 1.0220***
(34.02) (32.52) (39.28) (19.72) (22.57) (21.89)
SMB 0.2177*** 0.2557*** 0.3306*** -0.3679*** -0.1703*** -0.1563***
(4.59) (4.17) (7.08) (-6.8) (-4.22) (-4.70)
HML 0.1772*** 0.1575*** 0.3161*** -0.3552*** -0.2346*** -0.1429***
(3.19) (2.94) (7.11) (-4.71) (-4.53) (-2.90)
Intercept (a) -0.2502 -0.2398 -0.17015 -0.2108 -0.006 -0.17957
(-1.61) (-1.47) (0.24) (-1.02) (-0.04) (0.14)
Panel B: High levels of RD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.3096*** 1.2735*** 1.2617*** 1.0673*** 1.0926*** 0.9566***
(21.37) (21.66) (26.52) (17.6) (18.03) (22.08)
SMB 0.1508** 0.1436* 0.2360*** -0.4315*** -0.2235*** -0.1582***
(2.38) (1.85) (4.09) (-6.24) (-4.47) (-3.74)
HML 0.1418* 0.1097733 0.2629*** -0.4834*** -0.3154*** -0.2001***
(1.75) (1.44) (4.13) (-4.96) (-4.64) (-3.15)
Intercept (a) -0.0211 -0.0319 0.071032 0.2805 0.2797 0.1139
(-0.09) (-0.13) (0.34) (1.01) (1.27) (0.70)
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.8. Calendar-time returns (cont.)
This table provides results for the calendar-time returns. The calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns are 
determined by regressing the abnormal portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model:
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp(Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept       
In this regression, Rpt is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (portfolios are built equally 
weighted, EW, and value weighted, VW), Rft is the monthly risk-free return as measured by the 3-month T-
bill rate, Rmt is the monthly return on the market index as measured by the VW CRSP index, SMBt is the 
difference between returns of portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, and HMLt is the difference between 
returns of portfolios of high book-to-market (BM) stocks and low BM stocks. ap, bp, sp, and hp are the 
regression’s parameter estimates. The intercept ap is of special importance because it measures the average 
monthly abnormal portfolio return. If the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model can explain the portfolio 
excess return, then the intercept should yield a value of zero. Values significantly different from zero 
consequently represent abnormal returns. 
Panel C: Low levels of RD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.3077*** 1.2736*** 1.2574*** 1.0820*** 1.1650*** 1.0755***
(25.13) (23.31) (27.52) (12.88) (15.93) (15.21)
SMB 0.3032*** 0.4000*** 0.4497*** -0.3100*** -0.1200* -0.1732
(4.12) (4.23) (5.86) (-3.72) (-1.91) (-3.56)
HML 0.1905** 0.1729** 0.3422*** -0.2418** -0.1680** -0.902
(2.46) (2.30) (5.49) (-2.13) (-2.25) (-1.29)
Intercept (a) -0.4292** -0.3913* -0.3585* -0.6319** -0.2289 -0.4061**
(-2.00) (-1.78) (-1.79) (-2.20) (-1.09) (-2.47)
Panel D: High levels of AdE
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.1476*** 1.1136*** 1.1219*** 0.9450*** 0.9074*** 0.9533***
(14.93) (16.39) (20.50) (9.23) (12.96) (16.39)
SMB 0.3148*** 0.2661** 0.3366*** -0.2627* -0.2901*** -0.2738***
(3.00) (2.46) (3.21) (-1.92) (-0.33) (-3.99)
HML 0.0512 -0.0526 0.1662* -0.3466* -0.4338*** -0.2159**
(0.43) (-0.49) (1.70) (-1.94) (-4.81) (-2.48)
Intercept (a) -0.6111** -0.24 -0.2315 0.0914 -0.032 0.0001
(-2.21) (-0.91) (-1.03) (0.22) (-0.14) (0.00)
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.8. Calendar-time returns (cont.)
This table provides results for the calendar-time returns. The calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns are 
determined by regressing the abnormal portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model:
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp(Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept       
In this regression, Rpt is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (portfolios are built equally 
weighted, EW, and value weighted, VW), Rft is the monthly risk-free return as measured by the 3-month T-
bill rate, Rmt is the monthly return on the market index as measured by the VW CRSP index, SMBt is the 
difference between returns of portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, and HMLt is the difference between 
returns of portfolios of high book-to-market (BM) stocks and low BM stocks. ap, bp, sp, and hp are the 
regression’s parameter estimates. The intercept ap is of special importance because it measures the average 
monthly abnormal portfolio return. If the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model can explain the portfolio 
excess return, then the intercept should yield a value of zero. Values significantly different from zero 
consequently represent abnormal returns. 
Panel E: Low levels of AdE
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.3444*** 1.3219*** 1.3002*** 1.1132*** 1.1818*** 1.0397***
(31.18) (29.68) (35.87) (18.15) (20.76) (19.26)
SMB 0.2098*** 0.2608*** 0.3344*** -0.3807*** -0.1511*** -0.1408***
(4.14) (3.95) (6.69) (-6.63) (-3.46) (-3.86)
HML 0.1907*** 0.1906*** 0.3394*** -0.3522*** -0.1993*** -0.1255
(3.06) (3.16) (6.82) (-4.22) (-3.40) (-2.25)
Intercept (a) -0.1988 -0.2783 -0.1884 -0.3232 -0.0538 -0.2425*
(-1.10) (-1.45) (-1.10) (-1.36) (-0.29) (-1.65)
Panel F: High levels of CD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.2665*** 1.2750*** 1.2802*** 1.0472*** 1.1566*** 1.0560***
(15.53) (13.59) (20.04) (12.64) (10.15) (14.39)
SMB 0.0789 0.1183 0.2013*** -0.6014*** -0.2084** -0.2085***
(0.89) (0.97) (2.71) (-5.86) (-2.49) (-2.82)
HML 0.1882 0.1818 0.3329*** -0.5822*** -0.2505** -0.1850*
(1.58) (1.59) (3.83) (-3.38) (-2.03) (-1.78)
Intercept (a) -0.7406* -1.0863*** -0.6870** -0.3551 -0.4246 -0.6135**
(-1.95) (-2.74) (-2.27) (-0.54) (-0.97) (-2.16)
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.8. Calendar-time returns (cont.)
This table provides results for the calendar-time returns. The calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns are 
determined by regressing the abnormal portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model:
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp(Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept       
In this regression, Rpt is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (portfolios are built equally 
weighted, EW, and value weighted, VW), Rft is the monthly risk-free return as measured by the 3-month T-
bill rate, Rmt is the monthly return on the market index as measured by the VW CRSP index, SMBt is the 
difference between returns of portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, and HMLt is the difference between 
returns of portfolios of high book-to-market (BM) stocks and low BM stocks. ap, bp, sp, and hp are the 
regression’s parameter estimates. The intercept ap is of special importance because it measures the average 
monthly abnormal portfolio return. If the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model can explain the portfolio 
excess return, then the intercept should yield a value of zero. Values significantly different from zero 
consequently represent abnormal returns. 
Panel G: Low levels of CD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.3292*** 1.2931*** 1.2717*** 1.0856*** 1.1343*** 1.0155***
(30.62) (29.56) (34.69) (17.42) (20.08) (18.71)
SMB 0.2433*** 0.2787*** 0.3548*** -0.3236*** -0.1654*** -0.1486***
(4.47) (3.98) (6.50) (-5.28) (-3.63) (-3.99)
HML 0.1766*** 0.15556*** 0.3118*** -0.3151*** -0.2311*** -0.1346**
(2.86) (2.63) (6.35) (-3.80) (-4.03) (-2.45)
Intercept (a) -0.2065 -0.1508 -0.12 -0.2089 0.0458 -0.1243
(-1.23) (-0.86) (-0.76) (-0.96) (0.27) (-0.92)
Panel H: Low RD & Low CD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.2948*** 1.2275*** 1.2200*** 1.0666*** 1.1333*** 1.0738***
(23.05) (23.84) (25.18) (11.38) (13.54) (13.01)
SMB 0.3871*** 0.5245*** 0.5584*** -0.2013** -0.0982 -0.1728***
(4.55) (5.71) (6.24) (-2.12) (-1.28) (-3.14)
HML 0.1624* 0.1398* 0.3189*** -0.1716 -0.1855** -0.0646
(1.87) (1.75) (4.55) (-1.35) (-2.19) (-0.80)
Intercept (a) -0.4121* -0.2992 -0.3184 -0.6154** -0.1474 -0.3051
(-1.77) (-1.27) (-1.46) (-2.03) (-0.63) (-1.61)
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
58
Table 1.8. Calendar-time returns (cont.)
This table provides results for the calendar-time returns. The calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns are 
determined by regressing the abnormal portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model:
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp(Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept       
In this regression, Rpt is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (portfolios are built equally 
weighted, EW, and value weighted, VW), Rft is the monthly risk-free return as measured by the 3-month T-
bill rate, Rmt is the monthly return on the market index as measured by the VW CRSP index, SMBt is the 
difference between returns of portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, and HMLt is the difference between 
returns of portfolios of high book-to-market (BM) stocks and low BM stocks. ap, bp, sp, and hp are the 
regression’s parameter estimates. The intercept ap is of special importance because it measures the average 
monthly abnormal portfolio return. If the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model can explain the portfolio 
excess return, then the intercept should yield a value of zero. Values significantly different from zero 
consequently represent abnormal returns. 
Panel I: Low RD & High CD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.2344*** 1.3192*** 1.2948*** 1.0403*** 1.2953*** 1.0772***
(10.63) (9.38) (14.58) (7.17) (7.77) (11.63)
SMB 0.092 0.1008 0.1989** -0.6381*** -0.1463 -0.2199**
(0.77) (0.67) (2.18) (-4.72) (-1.22) (-2.59)
HML 0.2196 0.2383 0.3804*** -0.5609*** -0.0804 -0.178
(1.33) (1.55) (3.42) (-3.03) (-0.45) (-1.54)
Intercept (a) -0.8433 -1.3243** -0.8889** -0.9404 -0.6996 -1.0372***
(-1.68) (-2.51) (-2.27) (-0.91) (-1.26) (-2.99)
Panel J: High RD & Low CD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.3209*** 1.2965*** 1.2718*** 1.0880*** 1.1182*** 0.9558***
(18.76) (19.41) (22.93) (15.57) (16.30) (19.35)
SMB 0.1659** 0.1446* 0.2409*** -0.4154*** -0.2124*** -0.1558***
(2.41) (1.74) (3.85) (-5.57) (-3.97) (-3.49)
HML 0.1547* 0.1218 0.2715*** -0.4583*** -0.2858*** -0.2005***
(1.75) (1.48) (3.92) (-4.42) (-3.90) (-2.98)
Intercept (a) 0.035 0.0196 0.1047 0.2367 0.2646 0.0962
(0.14) (0.08) (0.46) (0.80) (1.13) (0.56)
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.8. Calendar-time returns (cont.)
This table provides results for the calendar-time returns. The calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns are 
determined by regressing the abnormal portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model:
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp(Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept       
In this regression, Rpt is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (portfolios are built equally 
weighted, EW, and value weighted, VW), Rft is the monthly risk-free return as measured by the 3-month T-
bill rate, Rmt is the monthly return on the market index as measured by the VW CRSP index, SMBt is the 
difference between returns of portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, and HMLt is the difference between 
returns of portfolios of high book-to-market (BM) stocks and low BM stocks. ap, bp, sp, and hp are the 
regression’s parameter estimates. The intercept ap is of special importance because it measures the average 
monthly abnormal portfolio return. If the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model can explain the portfolio 
excess return, then the intercept should yield a value of zero. Values significantly different from zero 
consequently represent abnormal returns. 
Panel K: High RD & High CD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.3056*** 1.1759*** 1.2332*** 0.9568*** 0.9569*** 0.9563***
(13.70) (13.81) (18.76) (9.09) (9.76) (14.05)
SMB 0.0061 0.1874 0.2060* -0.5472*** -0.2724** -0.1843
(0.04) (1.46) (1.75) (-3.27) (-2.20) (-1.23)
HML 0.0738 0.0784 0.2229 -0.6683* -0.5356*** -0.1200
(0.38) (0.43) (1.49) (-1.98) (-3.19) (-0.88)
Intercept (a) -0.6981 -0.5192 -0.2912 0.7188 0.4880 0.2827
(-1.66) (-1.04) (-0.68) (0.92) (0.86) (0.68)
Panel L: Low AdE & Low CD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.3597*** 1.3328*** 1.3039*** 1.1274*** 1.1842*** 1.0386***
(27.62) (26.70) (31.31) (16.01) (18.50) (16.29)
SMB 0.2391*** 0.2833*** 0.3588*** -0.3408*** -0.1463*** -0.1348***
(4.07) (3.72) (6.08) (-5.27) (-2.96) (-3.30)
HML 0.1886*** 0.1850*** 0.3352*** -0.3048--- -0.1973*** -0.1220*
(2.72) (2.79) (6.06) (-3.34) (-3.03) (-1.94)
Intercept (a) -0.1926 -0.2309 -0.1768 -0.3758 -0.0125 -0.1969
(-0.98) (-1.12) (-0.96) (-1.48) (-0.06) (-1.18)
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.8. Calendar-time returns (cont.)
This table provides results for the calendar-time returns. The calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns are 
determined by regressing the abnormal portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model:
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp(Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept       
In this regression, Rpt is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (portfolios are built equally 
weighted, EW, and value weighted, VW), Rft is the monthly risk-free return as measured by the 3-month T-
bill rate, Rmt is the monthly return on the market index as measured by the VW CRSP index, SMBt is the 
difference between returns of portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, and HMLt is the difference between 
returns of portfolios of high book-to-market (BM) stocks and low BM stocks. ap, bp, sp, and hp are the 
regression’s parameter estimates. The intercept ap is of special importance because it measures the average 
monthly abnormal portfolio return. If the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model can explain the portfolio 
excess return, then the intercept should yield a value of zero. Values significantly different from zero 
consequently represent abnormal returns. 
Panel M: Low AdE & High CD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.2551*** 1.2521*** 1.2702*** 1.0482*** 1.1639*** 1.0391***
(14.21) (12.63) (19.06) (11.34) (9.33) (13.36)
SMB 0.0713 0.1429 0.2196*** -0.5829*** -0.1877 -0.1832**
(0.74) (1.09) (2.71) (-5.08) (-2.13) (-2.17)
HML 0.2283 0.2461* 0.3794*** -0.6172*** -0.2077 -0.1461
(1.60) (1.77) (3.56) (-3.11) (-1.55) (-1.21)
Intercept (a) -0.5113 -0.8967* -0.4577 -0.1006 -0.4378 -0.6324*
(-1.17) (-1.95) (-1.31) (-0.13) (-0.82) (-1.88)
Panel N: High AdE & Low CD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.1523*** 1.1116*** 1.1235*** 0.9361*** 0.8966*** 0.9349***
(14.00) (16.15) (20.51) (8.52) (12.20) (15.77)
SMB 0.2946*** 0.2817** 0.3481*** -0.1741 -0.2783*** -0.2502***
(2.64) (2.46) (3.12) (-1.17) (-2.94) (-3.25)
HML 0.1012 0.0122 0.2227* -0.3018 -0.3834*** -0.1543
(0.72) (0.10) (1.92) (-1.40) (-3.98) (-1.50)
Intercept (a) -0.5006 -0.074 -0.094 0.2371 -0.0418 0.047
(-1.63) (-0.26) (-0.39) (0.52) (-0.16) (0.20)
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.8. Calendar-time returns (cont.)
This table provides results for the calendar-time returns. The calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns are 
determined by regressing the abnormal portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model:
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp(Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept       
In this regression, Rpt is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (portfolios are built equally 
weighted, EW, and value weighted, VW), Rft is the monthly risk-free return as measured by the 3-month T-
bill rate, Rmt is the monthly return on the market index as measured by the VW CRSP index, SMBt is the 
difference between returns of portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, and HMLt is the difference between 
returns of portfolios of high book-to-market (BM) stocks and low BM stocks. ap, bp, sp, and hp are the 
regression’s parameter estimates. The intercept ap is of special importance because it measures the average 
monthly abnormal portfolio return. If the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model can explain the portfolio 
excess return, then the intercept should yield a value of zero. Values significantly different from zero 
consequently represent abnormal returns. 
Panel O: High AdE & High CD
ER1 (ew) ER3 (ew) ER5 (ew) ER1 (vw) ER3 (vw) ER5 (vw)
ERmarket 1.1539*** 1.3489*** 1.2630*** 1.3717*** 0.9348*** 1.1874***
(7.25) (9.49) (8.97) (5.84) (5.64) (11.40)
SMB 0.5034** 0.1792 0.2749 -0.9322 -0.3153 -0.3837**
(3.28) (1.12) (1.83) (-3.24) (-1.68) (-2.47)
HML -0.0804 -0.0464 0.1177 -0.1457 -0.6183** -0.2578**
(-0.43) (-0.29) (0.90) (-0.48) (-3.23) (-2.32)
Intercept (a) -1.1493* -1.7225*** -1.3485*** -1.9780 0.0080 -0.7382
(-1.93) (-5.37) (-4.44) (-1.45) (0.01) (-1.49)
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.9. Ordinary least squares analysis explaining the abnormal operating 
performance of bidder firms in the three years following the announcement of a 
cross-border M&A
This table shows the results of two multivariate regression analyses to explain bidder firms’ abnormal 
operating performance in years 1, 2, and 3 after cross-border M&A announcements. Model 1 focuses on the 
variables of interest, which are intangible assets, cultural distance, and the interaction between them. Model 
2 further includes some common control variables. The variables used in this table are defined in Table 1.
Model 1
Variable Abnormal OP 1 Abnormal OP 2 Abnormal OP 3
Intercept -0.1202*** -0.0782*** -0.1925*
(-3.10) (-2.92) (-1.92)
RD -1.8160*** -1.3089*** -3.2864***
(-3.00) (-4.51) (-3.53)
AdE -0.2606 0.8006* 1.1680
(-0.39) (1.93) (0.80)
CD -0.0353 0.0585** 0.2105***
(-0.72) (1.97) (2.97)
CDRD -0.5684 1.0338*** 3.4006***
(-0.76) (2.74) (2.90)
CDAdE 0.0758 0.1538 0.2568
(0.18) (0.47) (0.22)
N 402 353 311
Adj. R2 0.5364 0.7286 0.4921
F-value 22.87*** 21.19*** 3.63***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.9. Ordinary least squares analysis explaining the abnormal operating 
performance of bidder firms in the three years following the announcement of a 
cross-border M&A (cont.)
This table shows the results of two multivariate regression analyses to explain bidder firms’ abnormal 
operating performance in years 1, 2, and 3 after cross-border M&A announcements. Model 1 focuses on the 
variables of interest, which are intangible assets, cultural distance, and the interaction between them. Model 
2 further includes some common control variables. The variables used in this table are defined in Table 1.
Model 2
Variable Abnormal OP 1 Abnormal OP 2 Abnormal OP 3
Intercept 0.4827** -0.3135*** -0.6909
(-2.29) (-3.27) (-1.23)
RD -1.7673*** -1.2967*** -3.1898***
(-2.74) (-3.95) (-2.98)
AdE -0.3724 0.3871 1.8335
(-0.48) (0.90) (0.74)
CD -0.0384 0.0412 0.1658***
(-0.80) (1.43) (2.58)
CDRD -0.6329 1.0327*** 3.2980**
(-0.79) (2.68) (2.34)
CDAdE -0.4723 -0.0241 -0.8517
(-0.74) (-0.06) (-0.42)
Size -0.0419 0.0350** 0.1079
(1.62) (2.17) (1.10)
Cash 0.0659 -0.0538 -0.3899
(0.77) (-0.57) (-1.57)
Exrate 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(-0.18) (0.87) (1.20)
Dev -0.03921 0.0249 -0.0512
(-0.67) (0.65) (-0.41)
Bprofit 0.3361 -0.0459 0.8989
(1.20) (-0.21) (0.71)
Related 0.0062 0.0673 0.1062
(0.09) (1.34) (-0.38)
N 398 349 307
Adj. R2 0.5549 0.7352 0.5042
F-value 13.89*** 20.91*** 2.80***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.10. Robustness tests for ordinary least squares analysis explaining the 
abnormal operating performance of bidder firms in the three years following the 
announcement of a cross-border M&A
This table shows the results of additional multivariate regression analyses to explain bidder firms’ 
abnormal operating performance in years 1, 2, and 3 after cross-border M&A announcements. Model 1 
examines the impact of previous bidder announcements on abnormal operating performance, and Model 2 
examines the impact of differences in wage levels between bidder and target countries on abnormal 
operating performance. The variables used in this table are defined in Table 1.
Model 1
Variable Abnormal OP 1 Abnormal OP 2 Abnormal OP 3
Intercept -0.1365*** -0.1112*** -0.2629*
(-2.71) (-2.93) (-1.65)
RD -1.8109*** -1.2934*** -3.2458***
(-2.99) (-4.42) (-3.50)
AdE -0.2350 0.8422** 1.2738
(-0.34) (2.02) (0.83)
CD -0.0377 0.0537* 0.2023***
(-0.77) (1.86) (2.92)
CDRD -0.5626 1.0535*** 3.4215***
(-0.75) (2.73) (2.90)
CDAdE 0.0463 0.1015 0.1197
(0.10) (0.30) (0.09)
Prev 0.03837 0.0801* 0.1638
(0.82) (1.81) (1.09)
N 402 353 311
Adj. R2 0.5370 0.7304 0.4932
F-value 19.28*** 19.86*** 3.17***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.10. Robustness tests for ordinary least squares analysis explaining the 
abnormal operating performance of bidder firms in the three years following the 
announcement of a cross-border M&A (cont.)
This table shows the results of additional multivariate regression analyses to explain bidder firms’ 
abnormal operating performance in years 1, 2, and 3 after cross-border M&A announcements. Model 1 
examines the impact of previous bidder announcements on abnormal operating performance, and Model 2 
examines the impact of differences in wage levels between bidder and target countries on abnormal 
operating performance. The variables used in this table are defined in Table 1.
Model 2
Variable Abnormal OP 1 Abnormal OP 2 Abnormal OP 3
Intercept -0.1188*** -0.1288*** -0.2672***
(-2.62) (-4.68) (-2.66)
RD -1.8596*** -1.2529*** -3.1853***
(-2.97) (-4.17) (-3.41)
AdE -0.1954 0.7608* 1.1103
(-0.30) (1.73) (0.73)
CD -0.0350 0.0541* 0.1992***
(-0.69) (1.70) (2.81)
CDRD -0.6323 1.1121*** 3.5445***
(-0.80) (2.83) (2.83)
CDAdE 0.0114 0.0351 0.1735
(0.03) (0.10) (0.14)
dGNI 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000
(-0.21) (1.86) (1.19)
N 381 336 296
Adj. R2 0.5398 0.7320 0.4924
F-value 19.30*** 22.15*** 3.08***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 1.10. Robustness tests for ordinary least squares analysis explaining the 
abnormal operating performance of bidder firms in the three years following the 
announcement of a cross-border M&A (cont.)
This table shows the results of additional multivariate regression analyses to explain bidder firms’ 
abnormal operating performance in years 1, 2, and 3 after cross-border M&A announcements. Model 1 
examines the impact of previous bidder announcements on abnormal operating performance, and Model 2 
examines the impact of differences in wage levels between bidder and target countries on abnormal 
operating performance. The variables used in this table are defined in Table 1.
Model 3
Variable OP 1 OP 2 OP 3
Intercept -0.1532*** -0.1186*** -0.2856*
(-3.16) (-3.00) (-1.72)
RD -1.8306*** -1.2822*** -3.2010***
(-2.94) (-4.53) (-3.53)
AdE -0.3425 0.7704* 1.0422
(-0.53) (1.80) (0.75)
CD -0.0549 0.0301 0.1534**
(-1.22) (0.97) (2.50)
CDRD -0.5922 1.0641*** 3.5022***
(-0.77) (2.86) (2.98)
CDAdE 0.0688 0.2147 0.2466
(0.15) (0.57) (0.21)
Civil 0.0781 0.0913* 0.2217
(1.49) (1.85) (1.26)
N 394 347 306
Adj. R2 0.5379 0.7302 0.4938
F-value 18.96*** 17.66*** 2.94***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
67
Table 1.10. Robustness tests for ordinary least squares analysis explaining the 
abnormal operating performance of bidder firms in the three years following the 
announcement of a cross-border M&A (cont.)
This table shows the results of additional multivariate regression analyses to explain bidder firms’ 
abnormal operating performance in years 1, 2, and 3 after cross-border M&A announcements. Model 1 
examines the impact of previous bidder announcements on abnormal operating performance, and Model 2 
examines the impact of differences in wage levels between bidder and target countries on abnormal 
operating performance. The variables used in this table are defined in Table 1.
Model 4
Variable OP 1 OP 2 OP 3
Intercept -0.4006** 0.1914 0.0528
(-1.97) (1.10) (0.08)
RD -1.8205*** -1.2465*** -3.1680***
(-3.02) (-4.26) (-3.32)
AdE -0.1093 0.6912 1.0903
(-0.17) (1.63) (0.66)
CD -0.0072 0.0343 0.2013**
(-0.16) (1.25) (2.42)
CDRD -0.5784 1.1140*** 3.5593***
(-0.77) (2.83) (2.81)
CDAdE 0.2085 0.0444 -0.0475
(0.46) (0.12) (-0.05)
Corruption 0.0322 -0.0308 -0.0273
(1.58) (-1.62) (-0.41)
N 394 347 306
Adj. R2 0.5386 0.7301 0.4927
F-value 18.94*** 18.34*** 3.25***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 2.1. Variables used in univariate and regression analyses
This table defines the different variables used in this paper’s univariate and regression
analyses.
Variables Definitions
1. CD Cultural distance measure based on Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions. See section 4.4. of this paper for the exact 
computation.
2. RD Dummy variable indicating that the bidder firm’s expense 
for research and development relative to total sales in the 
year prior to the announcement was greater than the 
industry average.
3. EM Dummy variable indicating that the announcing bidder firm 
is an early-mover.
4. REM Dummy variable indicating the rival firm is matched with 
an early-mover bidder firm.
5. F Dummy variable indicating that the announcing bidder firm 
is a follower.
6. RF Dummy variable indicating that rival firm is matched with 
a follower bidder firm.
7. LM Dummy variable indicating that the announcing bidder firm 
is a late-mover.
8. RLM Dummy variable indicating the rival firm is matched with a 
late-mover bidder firm.
9. Cash Dummy variable indicating that the acquisition was 
financed 100% using cash.
10. RelSize Transaction value of the acquisition divided by the natural
logarithm of the announcing firm’s total assets in the year
prior to the announcement.  
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Table 2.1. Variables used in univariate and regression analyses (cont.)
This table defines the different variables used in this paper’s univariate and regression
analyses.
Variables Definitions
11. Profit Announcing firm’s profitability, measured as the annual 
income divided by total assets in the year prior to the
announcement.
12. RProfit rival firm’s profitability, measured as the annual 
income divided by total assets in the year prior to the
bidder firm’s announcement.
13. Exrate Indicates the relative strength of the target country's 
currency with respect to the U.S. dollar.
14. Expansion Dummy variable indicating that the announcement took 
place during an expansionary economy.
15. Prior Dummy variable indicating that the announcing firm has
previous experience in the target country or its geographic
region.
16. RPrior Dummy variable indicating that the rival firm has
previous experience in the target country or its geographic
region.
17. CAR Announcing firm’s 3-day cumulative abnormal return.
18. Civil Dummy variable indicating that the target is located in a 
civil law country compared to a common law country.
19. Corruption Variable indicating the degree of investor protection in the 
target country, measured by the corruption index (ranges 
from low (0) to high (1)).
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Table 2.2. Distribution by year of announcement
The number of sample firms announcing cross-border M&As in a particular year over the time frame 
from 1987 to 2004 is shown below.
Year Frequency % Cumulative frequency Cumulative %
1987 1 0.58 1 0.58
1988 4 2.31 5 2.89
1989 4 2.31 9 5.20
1990 2 1.16 11 6.36
1991 2 1.16 13 7.51
1992 5 2.89 18 10.40
1993 2 1.16 20 11.56
1994 5 2.89 25 14.45
1995 8 4.62 33 19.08
1996 7 4.05 40 23.12
1997 10 5.78 50 28.90
1998 22 12.72 72 41.62
1999 14 8.09 86 49.71
2000 26 15.03 112 64.74
2001 15 8.67 127 73.41
2002 12 6.94 139 80.35
2003 12 6.94 151 87.28
2004 22 12.72 173 100.00
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 Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics for announcing firm sample and industry-related 
rival portfolio
Panel A provides the mean and median descriptive for firms announcing cross-border M&As.
Panel B provides similar statistics for the industry rival firm portfolios of the announcing sample firms.
Panels C and D provide rival firm statistics for rival firms that have cross-border M&A announcements 
themselves and rivals that do not have any cross-border M&A announcements, respectively. 
Panels E and F provide rival firm statistics for rival firms that become subsequent bidders themselves 
and rival firms that do not becomes subsequent bidders, respectively.
Panels G and H provide rival firm statistics for rival firms that become subsequent bidders with no 
previous announcements and with previous announcements, respectively.
Key Variables Mean Median
Number 
reporting
Panel A: Announcing Firms
HCD
Transaction Value (in millions) 264.80 58.75 173
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.06 0.04 173
Net Income (in millions) 262.47 23.57 173
Cash Flow (in  millions) 405.17 59.70 173
Sales (in millions) 1714.98 662.19 173
Research and development (in millions) 299.39 18.30 173
Advertisement (in millions) 61.12 0.00 173
Total assets (in millions) 2945.39 915.43 173
Research and delvelopment / Sales 0.10 0.08 173
Advertisement / Sales 0.01 0.00 173
Profitability (Net Income / Total Assets) 0.03 0.04 173
Size (ln(total assets)) 6.70 6.82 173
Relative Size (Transaction Value / Size) 0.16 0.09 173
ROE 8.95 9.98 173
CAR -0.007 -0.004 173
Panel B: Industry Rivals - All Rivals
Net Income (in millions) 370.15 16.32 1354
Cash Flow (in  millions) 532.28 53.80 1343
Sales (in millions) 2083.39 486.48 1354
Research and development (in millions) 223.32 19.61 1354
Advertisement (in millions) 35.92 0.00 1354
Total assets (in millions) 3612.42 759.64 1353
Research and delvelopment / Sales 0.16 0.11 1354
Advertisement / Sales 0.01 0.00 1354
Profitability (Net Income / Total Assets) -0.01 0.05 1353
Size (ln(total assets)) 6.56 6.63 1353
ROE 2.84 9.79 1354
Rival CAR -0.003* -0.002** 1354
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Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics for announcing firm sample and industry-related 
rival portfolio (cont.)
Panel A provides the mean and median descriptive for firms announcing cross-border M&As.
Panel B provides similar statistics for the industry rival firm portfolios of the announcing sample firms.
Panels C and D provide rival firm statistics for rival firms that have cross-border M&A announcements 
themselves and rivals that do not have any cross-border M&A announcements, respectively. 
Panels E and F provide rival firm statistics for rival firms that become subsequent bidders themselves 
and rival firms that do not becomes subsequent bidders, respectively.
Panels G and H provide rival firm statistics for rival firms that become subsequent bidders with no 
previous announcements and with previous announcements, respectively.
Key Variables Mean Median Number reporting
Panel C: Industry Rivals - Matched within-sample
Net Income (in millions) 376.00 14.75 1181
Cash Flow (in  millions) 535.00 52.88 1170
Sales (in millions) 1995.25 464.41 1181
Research and development (in millions) 228.26 20.20 1181
Advertisement (in millions) 36.28 0.00 1181
Total assets (in millions) 3603.41 763.49 1180
Research and delvelopment / Sales 0.17 0.12 1181
Advertisement / Sales 0.01 0.00 1181
Profitability (Net Income / Total Assets) -0.01 0.05 1181
Size (ln(total assets)) 6.57 6.64 1180
ROE 1.82 9.78 1181
Rival CAR -0.004** -0.002** 1181
Panel D: Industry Rivals - Matched out-of-sample
Net Income (in millions) 319.01 27.76 173
Cash Flow (in  millions) 508.73 56.66 173
Sales (in millions) 2853.76 600.11 173
Research and development (in millions) 180.21 17.00 173
Advertisement (in millions) 32.80 0.00 173
Total assets (in millions) 3691.19 744.32 173
Research and delvelopment / Sales 0.10 0.06 173
Advertisement / Sales 0.01 0.00 173
Profitability (Net Income / Total Assets) 0.03 0.05 173
Size (ln(total assets)) 6.70 6.61 173
ROE 11.72 10.58 173
Rival CAR -0.000 0.001 173
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Table 2.4. Univariate analysis for bidder firms
Panel A provides the mean and median announcement returns for all bidder firms and for early-movers (EM), pioneers (P), followers 
(F), and late-movers (LM).
Panel B provides differences in means for the various types of bidder firms.
Panel C provides mean and median announcement returns and differences in means for sub-samples, categorized by type of bidder 
firm and level of R&D.
Panel D provides additional differences in means for sub-samples, categorized by type of bidder firm and level of R&D.
Panel E provides mean and median announcement returns and differences in means for sub-samples, categorized of by type of bidder 
firms and level of cultural distance.
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
Panel A. Mean and median CARs
Window Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
(-1,+1) -0.677 -0.310 -2.084 -2.226 * -0.03 -0.109 -0.928 -0.284 1.508 1.015
(0,+1) -0.431 -0.531 -1.859 -1.095 ** -0.032 -0.01 -0.503 -0.558 1.192 0.690
LM (N = 33)
All Bidder Firms               
(N = 173) EM (N = 32) P (N = 12) F (N = 108)
Panel B. Differences in means by type of bidder firm
Window
(-1,+1) -1.81 * -0.65 1.44 0.79 -1.79 *
(0,+1) -1.64 -0.79 1.02 1.03 -1.85 *
Panel C. Differences in mean by type of bidder firm and level of R&D
Window Mean Median Mean Median ttest
(-1,+1) EM all -2.084 -2.226 * LM Low R&D 1.722 1.304 -1.84 *
(0,+1) N = 32 -1.859 -1.095 ** N = 30 1.383 0.707 -1.67
(-1,+1) EM High R&D -3.043 -1.086 LM Low R&D 1.722 1.304 -1.80 *
(0,+1) N = 12 -3.172 -0.971 N = 30 1.383 0.707 -1.85 *
(-1,+1) EM High R&D -3.043 -1.086 LM High R&D -0.632 0.260 -0.47
(0,+1) N = 12 -3.172 -0.971 N = 3 -0.725 -1.088 -0.61
(-1,+1) EM Low R&D -1.509 -3.119 LM Low R&D 1.722 1.304 -1.38
(0,+1) N = 20 -1.072 -1.202 N = 30 1.383 0.707 -1.08
Panel D. Sub-sample of CARs by type of bidder firm and level of R&D
Mean Median Mean Median ttest
Full Sample
(-1,+1) High R&D 0.514 0.260 Low R&D -0.842 -0.425 0.51
(0,+1) N = 21 -0.012 -0.744 N = 152 -0.489 -0.408 0.20
EM
(-1,+1) High R&D -0.030 -0.011 Low R&D -1.509 -3.119 -0.47
(0,+1) N = 12 -0.032 -0.001 N = 20 -1.072 -1.202 -0.72
F
(-1,+1) High R&D 0.082 0.025 Low R&D -1.465 * -0.566 1.37
(0,+1) N = 6 0.067 0.034 N = 102 -0.925 -0.610 1.18
LM
(-1,+1) High R&D -0.006 0.003 Low R&D 1.722 1.304 -0.54
(0,+1) N = 3 -0.007 -0.011 N = 30 1.383 0.707 -0.48
P vs LMEM vs LM EM vs F LM vs F P vs F
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Table 2.4. Univariate analysis for bidder firms (cont.)
Panel A provides the mean and median announcement returns for all bidder firms and for early-movers (EM), pioneers (P), followers 
(F), and late-movers (LM).
Panel B provides differences in means for the various types of bidder firms.
Panel C provides mean and median announcement returns and differences in means for sub-samples, categorized by type of bidder 
firm and level of R&D.
Panel D provides additional differences in means for sub-samples, categorized by type of bidder firm and level of R&D.
Panel E provides mean and median announcement returns and differences in means for sub-samples with high levels of cultural 
distance, categorized of by type of bidder firms.
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
Panel E. Sub-sample of CARs of by type of bidder firm when the level of cultural distance is high
Window Mean Median Mean Median ttest
(-1,+1) EM -4.685 *** -4.425 F -1.312 -0.232 -2.18 **
(0,+1) N = 4 -2.222 -2.265 N = 19 -0.509 -1.047 -0.90
(-1,+1) EM -4.685 *** -4.425 LM 5.108 * 6.879 -4.24 ***
(0,+1) N = 4 -2.222 -2.265 N = 5 0.703 -0.241 -0.76
(-1,+1) LM 5.108 * 6.879 F -1.312 -0.232 2.13 **
(0,+1) N = 5 0.703 -0.241 N = 19 -0.509 -1.047 0.37
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Table 2.5. Univariate analysis for rival firms
Panel A provides the mean and median announcement returns for all rival firms and for rivals of early movers (REM), followers (RF), 
and late movers (RLM).
Panel B provides differences in means for the various types of bidder firms.
Panel C provides mean and median announcement returns and differences in means for sub-samples, categorized of by type of bidder 
firm and level of cultural distance.
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
Panel A. Mean and median CARs
All rival firms Rivals to early-movers 
(REM)
Rivals to followers (RF) Rivals to late-movers 
(RLM)
Window Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
(-1,+1) -0.348 * -0.164 ** -0.356 -0.255 -0.537 ** -0.301 *** 0.229 0.371
(0,+1) -0.239 -0.287 *** -0.174 -0.590 * -0.434 ** -0.520 *** 0.304 0.255
Panel B. Differences in mean by type of rival firm
Window REM vs RLM REM vs RF RLM vs RF
(-1,+1) -1.17 0.43 1.75 *
(0,+1) -1.19 0.69 2.22 **
Panel C. Sub-sample of CARs by type of rival firm and level of cultural distance
Window Mean Median Mean Median ttest
High CD Low CD
(-1,+1) All Rivals -1.676 *** -0.570 *** All Rivals -0.208 -0.113 -2.39 **
(0,+1) -1.412 *** -0.779 *** -0.115 -0.218 *** -2.55 **
(-1,+1) REM -3.314 ** -2.100 *** REM -0.131 0.005 -2.40 **
(0,+1) -1.882 * -1.145 -0.045 -0.531 -1.51
(-1,+1) RF -1.843 ** -0.418 ** RF -0.385 -0.281 ** -1.83 *
(0,+1) -1.280 * -0.575 * -0.336 -0.520 *** -1.27
(-1,+1) RLM -0.065 0.631 RLM 0.258 0.359 -0.25
(0,+1) -1.598 ** -0.873 * 0.487* 0.282 ** -2.28 **
ttest
Window REM vs 
RF
REM vs 
RLM
RLM vs 
RF
REM vs 
RF
REM vs 
RLM
RLM vs 
RF
(-1,+1) -1.05 -2.03 ** 1.33 0.58 -0.74 1.39
(0,+1) -0.49 -0.23 -0.31 0.75 -1.26 2.37 **
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Table 2.6. Bidder firm regression
This table shows the results of three ordinary least square regressions to explain the bidder firms’ 3-day CAR during a 
cross-border M&A announcement. Model 1 focuses on early movers, Model 2 focuses on followers, and Model 3 
focuses on late movers. CD measures the cultural distance index, RD measures R&D expenses relative to sales in the 
year prior to the announcement, Cash is a dummy variable equal to 1.0 if the acquisition is completely financed using 
cash, RelSize is the acquisition value relative to the natural log of the bidder firms total assets in the year prior to the 
announcement, Profit is the annual income divided by total assets in the year prior to the announcement, EM is a 
dummy variable equal to 1.0 is the bidder is an early-mover, F is a dummy variable equal to 1.0 if the bidder is a 
follower, LM is a dummy variable equal to 1.0 if the bidder is a late-mover, and Expansion is a dummy variable equal 
to 1.0 if the announcement took place in an expansionary economy.  We further include interaction terms between 
bidder type and level of R&D expenses, and between bidder type, level of R&D expenses, and level of 
cultural distance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Intercept -0.0760 -3.31*** -0.0581 -2.30** -0.0790 -3.63***
CD -0.0165 -1.07 0.0005 0.03 -0.0127 -0.83
RD 0.0513 0.59 -0.1709 -2.48** -0.0114 -0.16
Cash 0.0278 1.68* 0.03343 2.07** 0.0303 1.87*
RelSize -0.0001 -1.18 -0.0001 -1.57 -0.0001 -1.70*
Profit -0.0321 -0.55 -0.0348 -0.62 -0.0165 -0.26
Exrate 0.0151 2.21** 0.0103 1.57 0.0125 1.80*
EM 0.0208 1.09
EM*RD -0.2656 -2.13**
EM*RD*CD -0.1450 -0.69
F -0.0380 -2.67***
F*RD 0.3405 2.48***
F*RD*CD -0.1535 -1.82*
LM 0.0284 1.70*
LM*RD -0.0196 -0.10
LM*RD*CD 0.0143 0.07
Expansion 0.0411 2.38** 0.0474 2.41** 0.0440 2.80***
N 173 173 173
Adj. R2 8.63% 9.67% 6.91%
F-Statistic 3.34*** 3.43*** 2.43**
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
77
Table 2.7. Bidder firm regression, including additional control variables
This table shows the results of seven ordinary least square regressions to explain the bidder firms’ 3-day 
CAR during a cross-border M&A announcement. All models focus on early movers and late movers 
compared to followers. Models 1 through 6 control for the legal environment (see LLSV), and Model 7 
controls for the bidder firms’ previous experience overseas. Specifically, Models 1 through 3 control for the 
type of law in the target country (civil law versus common law), Models 4 through 6 control for the level of 
investor protection in the target country, measured by the corruption index, and Model 7 controls for 
previous bidder firm experience in the target country and its geographic area. The variables used in these 
regressions are defined in Table 1. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Intercept -0.0762 -3.32*** -0.0566 -2.23** -0.0785 -3.61***
CD -0.0351 -1.82* -0.0173 -0.83 -0.0275 -1.45
RD 0.0468 0.54 -0.1835 -2.57** -0.0173 -0.24
Cash 0.0264 1.59 0.0322 1.99** 0.0292 1.80*
RelSize -0.0001 -1.05 -0.0001 -1.46 -0.0001 -1.60
Profit -0.0339 -0.57 -0.0350 -0.61 -0.01644 -0.26
Exrate 0.0175 2.58** 0.0124 1.88* 0.0142 2.06**
EM 0.0235 1.21
EM*RD -0.2667 -2.12**
EM*RD*CD -0.2239 -1.05
F -0.0398 -2.78***
F*RD 0.3490 2.54**
F*RD*CD -0.1512 -1.80*
LM 0.0295 1.77*
LM*RD -0.0141 -0.08
LM*RD*CD -0.0222 -0.10
Expansion 0.0391 2.25** 0.0458 2.32** 0.0425 2.67***
Civil 0.0293 1.12 0.0263 1.05 0.0234 0.88
N 173 173 173
Adj. R2 9.20% 10.14% 7.29%
F-Statistic 3.43*** 3.49*** 2.29**
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
78
Table 2.7. Bidder firm regression, including additional control variables (cont.)
This table shows the results of seven ordinary least square regressions to explain the bidder firms’ 3-day 
CAR during a cross-border M&A announcement. All models focus on early movers and late movers 
compared to followers. Models 1 through 6 control for the legal environment (see LLSV), and Model 7 
controls for the bidder firms’ previous experience overseas. Specifically, Models 1 through 3 control for the 
type of law in the target country (civil law versus common law), Models 4 through 6 control for the level of 
investor protection in the target country, measured by the corruption index, and Model 7 controls for 
previous bidder firm experience in the target country and its geographic area. The variables used in these 
regressions are defined in Table 1. 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Intercept -0.2021 -1.20 -0.2136 -1.29 -0.2090 -1.24 -0.0953 -2.71***
CD -0.0146 -1.02 0.0039 0.28 -0.0099 -0.79 0.0170 1.17
RD 0.0572 0.65 -0.1617 -2.26** -0.0054 -0.08 0.0291 1.22
Cash 0.0296 1.75* 0.0358 2.18** 0.0321 1.95* 0.0366 2.38**
RelSize -0.0001 -1.24 -0.0001 -1.62 -0.0001 -1.73* -0.0001 -1.52
Profit -0.0333 -0.56 -0.0365 -0.64 -0.0182 -0.29 -0.0549 -1.11
Exrate 0.0120 2.16** 0.0065 1.25 0.0092 1.71* 0.0158 2.18**
EM 0.0208 1.08 -0.0394 -1.80*
EM*RD -0.2666 -2.14**
EM*RD*CD -0.1280 -0.60
F -0.00379 -2.62***
F*RD 0.3435 2.52**
F*RD*CD -0.1618 -1.97*
LM 0.0282 1.66* 0.0200 1.11
LM*RD -0.0144 -0.08
LM*RD*CD -0.0261 -0.14
Expansion 0.0431 2.41** 0.0498 2.42** 0.0461 2.76*** 0.0313 1.11
Corruption 0.0132 0.79 0.0163 0.99 0.0137 0.82
Prior 0.0301 1.74*
N 173 173 173 121
Adj. R2 8.96% 10.17% 7.27% 7.30%
F-Statistic 3.07*** 3.08*** 2.21** 1.96**
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 2.8. Rival firm regression
This table shows the results of three ordinary least square regressions to explain the rival firms’ 3-day CAR 
during a cross-border M&A bidder announcement. 
Panel A focuses on rivals of early-movers.
Panel B focuses on rivals of followers. 
Panel C focuses on rivals of followers and late-movers compared to rivals of early-movers.
The variables used in these regressions are defined in Table 1. 
Panel A Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept 0.0145 1.63 0.0170 1.91* 0.0168 1.90*
CAR 0.1257 6.98*** 0.1362 7.38*** 0.1366 7.41***
CD -0.0104 -2.46** -0.0105 -2.50** -0.0104 -2.48**
RD -0.0141 -1.19 -0.0434 -2.62*** -0.0429 -2.66***
RD*CD 0.0137 0.26 0.0781 1.36 0.0754 1.33
Cash -0.0023 -0.66 -0.0030 -0.86 -0.0028 -0.80
Exchange 0.0847 1.82* 0.0805 1.73* 0.0785 1.69*
Profit -0.0006 -0.04 -0.0081 -0.55 -0.0087 -0.59
RProfit 0.0091 1.50 0.0091 1.51 0.0091 1.50
Expansion -0.0132 -2.31** -0.0139 -2.43** -0.0137 -2.40**
RPrior -0.0080 -1.29 -0.0085 -1.38 -0.0086 -1.39
EM 0.0153 2.83*** 0.0115 2.06** 0.0115 2.07**
EM*RD 0.0386 2.51**
EM*RD*CD 0.3266 2.61***
N 997 997 997
Adj. R2 4.90% 5.41% 5.46%
F-Statistic 5.67 *** 5.75 *** 5.79 ***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 2.8. Rival firm regression (cont.)
This table shows the results of three ordinary least square regressions to explain the rival firms’ 3-day CAR 
during a cross-border M&A bidder announcement. 
Panel A focuses on rivals of early-movers.
Panel B focuses on rivals of followers. 
Panel C focuses on rivals of followers and late-movers compared to rivals of early-movers.
The variables used in these regressions are defined in Table 1. 
Panel B Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept 0.0152 1.69* 0.0184 2.03** 0.0182 2.01**
CAR 0.1137 6.56*** 0.1312 7.14*** 0.1313 7.15***
CD -0.0096 -2.25** -0.0098 -2.32** -0.0097 -2.30**
RD -0.0073 -0.64 -0.0022 -0.19 -0.0463 -2.60***
RD*CD 0.0048 0.09 0.0916 1.52 0.4596 2.74***
Cash -0.0026 -0.73 -0.0038 -1.06 -0.0036 -1.00
Exrate 0.0668 1.39 0.0614 1.28 0.0588 1.23
Profit 0.0113 0.80 -0.0012 -0.08 -0.0015 -0.10
RProfit 0.0093 1.54 0.0094 1.56 0.0093 1.55
Expansion -0.0082 -1.43 -0.0109 -1.89* -0.0107 -1.85*
RPrior -0.0063 -1.01 -0.0073 -1.18 -0.0073 -1.18
F -0.0072 -1.92* -0.0043 -1.12 -0.0044 -1.14
F*RD -0.0456 -2.80***
F*RD*CD -0.3733 -2.85***
N 997 997 997
Adj. R2 4.49% 5.15% 5.17%
F-Statistic 5.25 *** 5.50 *** 5.53 ***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Table 2.8. Rival firm regression (cont.)
This table shows the results of three ordinary least square regressions to explain the rival firms’ 3-day CAR 
during a cross-border M&A bidder announcement. 
Panel A focuses on rivals of early-movers.
Panel B focuses on rivals of followers. 
Panel C focuses on rivals of followers and late-movers compared to rivals of early-movers.
The variables used in these regressions are defined in Table 1. 
Panel C Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept 0.0293 2.60*** 0.0310 2.72*** 0.0308 2.71***
CAR 0.1253 6.89*** 0.1414 7.38*** 0.1417 7.41***
CD -0.0103 -2.42** -0.0105 -2.48** -0.0105 -2.46**
RD -0.0140 -1.19 -0.0072 -0.57 -0.0521 -2.89***
RD*CD 0.0144 0.28 0.0984 1.63 0.4768 2.80***
Cash -0.0024 -0.67 -0.0035 -0.97 -0.0032 -0.91
Exrate 0.0825 1.70* 0.0777 1.60 0.0754 1.55
Profit 0.0002 0.01 -0.0114 -0.73 -0.0120 -0.76
RProfit 0.0090 1.50 0.0091 1.51 0.0091 1.50
Expansion -0.0129 -2.10** -0.0151 -2.44** -0.0149 -2.41**
RPrior -0.0079 -1.26 -0.0088 -1.41 -0.0089 -1.42
LM -0.0146 -2.07** -0.0133 -1.84* -0.0133 -1.85*
LM*RD -0.0117 -0.42
LM*RD*CD -0.1135 -0.51
F -0.0154 -2.83*** -0.0118 -2.09** -0.0118 -2.10**
F*RD -0.0459 -2.76***
F*RD*CD -0.3828 -2.84***
N 997 997 997
Adj. R2 4.81% 5.35% 5.39%
F-Statistic 5.19 *** 5.02 *** 5.06 ***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Appendix A: Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension
Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as described on his Web site, http://www.geert-
hofstede.com.
Power Distance Index (PDI) focuses on the degree of equality, or inequality, 
between people in the country's society. A High Power Distance ranking indicates that 
inequalities of power and wealth have been allowed to grow within the society. These 
societies are more likely to follow a caste system that does not allow significant upward 
mobility of its citizens. A Low Power Distance ranking indicates the society de-
emphasizes the differences between citizen's power and wealth. In these societies equality 
and opportunity for everyone is stressed.
Individualism (IDV) focuses on the degree the society reinforces individual or 
collective achievement and interpersonal relationships. A High Individualism ranking 
indicates that individuality and individual rights are paramount within the society. 
Individuals in these societies may tend to form a larger number of looser relationships. A 
Low Individualism ranking typifies societies of a more collectivist nature with close ties 
between individuals. These cultures reinforce extended families and collectives where 
everyone takes responsibility for fellow members of their group. 
Masculinity (MAS) focuses on the degree the society reinforces, or does not 
reinforce, the traditional masculine work role model of male achievement, control, and 
power. A High Masculinity ranking indicates the country experiences a high degree of 
gender differentiation. In these cultures, males dominate a significant portion of the 
society and power structure, with females being controlled by male domination. A Low 
Masculinity ranking indicates the country has a low level of differentiation and 
discrimination between genders. In these cultures, females are treated equally to males in 
all aspects of the society. 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) focuses on the level of tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity within the society - i.e. unstructured situations. A High 
Uncertainty Avoidance ranking indicates the country has a low tolerance for uncertainty 
and ambiguity. This creates a rule-oriented society that institutes laws, rules, regulations, 
and controls in order to reduce the amount of uncertainty. A Low Uncertainty Avoidance 
ranking indicates the country has less concern about ambiguity and uncertainty and has 
more tolerance for a variety of opinions. This is reflected in a society that is less rule-
oriented, more readily accepts change, and takes more and greater risks. 
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